

## St. Thomas and the Knowledge of the Singular

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### THE PROBLEM

CAN THE HUMAN intellect gain a knowledge of singular material things? If it can, how is this to be explained? These questions pose two problems: one philosophical, the other historical. The philosophical problem is this: at least some intellectual knowledge is universal, necessary, and abstract (mathematics, theoretical physics, logic, some parts of philosophy). The conditions of such knowledge seem to require abstraction from singularity, contingency, existence, and matter. How can knowledge which does not abstract be intellectual, if intellection involves abstraction? This problem is more acute for anyone who accepts the commonest Aristotelian argument<sup>1</sup> for the spirituality of the soul. This argument, which involves the principle that the source of singularity in things which have the same specific essence is matter, concludes to the immateriality of the act of knowing the absolute natures of material things, then to the immateriality and spirituality of the power by which such knowing is carried on, and finally to the spirituality of the human soul. But if all this is true, how can the

<sup>1</sup> When Aristotle uses the argument from universal knowledge (for example, *De Anima* ii. 5, 417b22) or from abstract knowledge (for example, *ibid.* iii. 4, 429b10-16), he does little more than illustrate what he means—universal and abstract knowledge, for example, is knowledge of flesh, or the nature of flesh. The reason for his brevity is probably because Plato had sufficiently discussed this point. However, Aristotle uses other arguments which he explains more fully, for example, that the intellect is not injured by the excellence of the intelligible (*De Anima* iii. 4, 429a 10-b3), that the intellect knows all material natures, and so can have no material nature (*ibid.* 429a19-21), that the intellect is capable of truth and falsity (*ibid.*, 3, 427b10-12).

spiritual intellect perform an act of knowing a singular material thing? We will investigate this problem indirectly, through the solution of the historical problem.

This historical problem is the problem of the text of St. Thomas. It would be very easy to show, from a study of the opinions of his followers, that St. Thomas's explanation of the intellectual knowledge of the singular material thing is not to be fully found in any single text. Some Thomists deny that the human intellect knows the singular; others merely repeat the brief, enigmãtic phrases of the Master; others provide explanations that are either against the letter of the text or are at variance with experience. But such a study of opinions would be singularly unrewarding. It is, moreover, unnecessary, since the problem is placed with all desirable clarity in the Thomistic text itself.

St. Thomas very often uses the Aristotelian argument that intellectual knowledge is universal and abstract.<sup>2</sup> Very often he treats this argument as a commonly accepted one, and consequently neglects to explain it. On occasion, he is content with one or two examples; thus, he will refer to the experienced fact that we know not only *this* stone or *this* man, but also stone absolutely and man absolutely. St. Thomas then goes on to show that such knowledge is an immaterial (that is, a spiritual) activity. This conclusion is complicated by the explanation of human knowledge. For human intellectual knowledge arises from material things. Hence, St. Thomas concludes that intellectual knowledge is specified by an intelligible form or *species*, which, because it inheres in a spiritual power, must itself be

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<sup>2</sup> For example, *In II De Anima*, c. 5, lect 12 (ed. Angelo M. Pirotta, O. P. [Turin: Marietti, 1924], No. 377); *ibid.*, III, c. 4, lect. 8 (No. 713); *ST* I. 75.5; *Contra Gentiles* II. 66. However, St. Thomas also uses, and very carefully explains, the other Aristotelian arguments; cf. *In III De Anima*, c. 4, lect. 7 (Nos. 677, 681); *II*, c. 3, lect 5 (No. 284); *III*, c. 4, lect 7 (Nos. 687-88); *III*, c. 3, lect. 4 (Nos. 630-31).

immaterial. But if this is so, the intelligible *species* can be the formal principle only of universal and abstract knowledge.

Every form of itself is universal. Thus, a builder by his art knows a house in general, it is true, but he does not know this or that house, except inasmuch as he has a knowledge of it by sense. But if the form of art were productive of the matter as it is of the form, by it he would know the artifact by reason of its form and of its matter. Consequently, since the principle of individuation is matter, he would not only know the house according to its universal nature, but also inasmuch as it is a certain singular thing. Furthermore, since the Divine Art is productive not only of the form but also of the matter, there is in that art the intelligible essence (*ratio*) not only of the form but also of the matter. Consequently, God knows things by reason of their matter as well as of their form, and so He knows not only universals but also singulars.

But here a doubt arises. Since everything which is in something is in it according to the manner of that in which it is, and since consequently the likeness of a thing is in God only immaterially, how can it be that our intellect, just because it receives the forms of things immaterially, does not know singulars, where God does know them? The reason for this will become evident, if we consider the different relations which the likeness of the thing in our intellect has to the thing itself, and which the likeness of the thing in the Divine Intellect has. For the likeness which is in our intellect is received from the thing inasmuch as the thing acts upon our intellect, having first acted upon the senses. But matter, on account of its deficiency in being, cannot be a principle of action. Hence, a material thing which acts upon our soul acts only through its form. Consequently, the likeness of the thing which is imprinted upon the sense and, which, having been purified in several steps, reaches the intellect, is a likeness only of the form. But the likeness of the thing which is in the Divine Intellect is productive of the thing. . . . Because it is necessary for knowledge that the likeness of the thing known be in the knower, but not that it be there in the same way as it is in the thing, hence it is that our intellect does not know those singulars the knowledge of which depends on matter because there is no likeness of matter in it. The reason is not that the likeness is in the intellect immaterially. The Divine Intellect, on the other hand, which possesses a likeness of matter, even though immaterially, can know singular things.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> *De Veritate*, II. 5.

St. Thomas more or less fully reiterates this stand very many times.<sup>4</sup>

In this argument, basic metaphysical principles are deeply involved. It would seem to be absolutely impossible for St. Thomas to assert that the human intellect knows singular material things. Yet he not only says that we know by intellect that which exists as a singular material thing,<sup>5</sup> he also formally and explicitly says that we can and do intellectually know singular material things.<sup>6</sup> How can he do this?

#### KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNIVERSAL AND OF THE SINGULAR

Before we attempt to investigate St. Thomas' explanation, it may be well to make sure that we understand just what is in question. First of all, sensation and intellection are often

<sup>4</sup> Here is an incomplete list of these passages: *In I Sent.*, d. 36, l. 1 ad 1; *In II Sent.*, d. 17, 2. 1 ad 3; *In III Sent.*, d. 26, 1. 2; *De Veritate*, II. 4 ad 1; 5 ad 1, 2; 5; VIII. 11; *De Malo*, XVI. 7 ad 5; *In II De Anima*, lect. 12 (ed. Pirotta, 379), lect. 13 (396); *Contra Gentiles*, I. 44 "Item ex hoc"; 63 "Prima est"; 65 "Adhuc primum"; "Item, agens"; II. 52, 73, 74 "Memoria vero"; *In lib. Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus*, c. 7, lect. 4; *Summa Theologiae*, I. 14. 11; 50. 2; 56. 1 ad 2; 59. 1 ad 1, 55. 3 ad 2; 57. 1 ad 2; 85. 3; *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, IX ad 15; *In I Post Analyt.*, lect. 30, lect. 42; *In I Peri Hermen.*, lect. 3, lect. 14; *Compend. Theol.*, cc. 85, 88.

<sup>5</sup> Typical-passages are: *In II Sent.*, d. 20, 2. 2 ad 3; d. 24, 2. 3 ad 4; *In lib. Boethii De Trinitate*, V. 2, 4 ad 6; VI. 1, 2 ad 5; *Contra Gentiles* I. 59; II. 75; III. 75; *In VI Ethic.*, lect. 1 (Pirotta, 1123), *In VII Ethic.*, lect. 3 (1139-40); *De Potent.*, III. 9 ad 22; *Summa Theologiae* I. 79. 9 ad 2, 3; 81. 1 and ad 5; 84. 1, 7; 85. 1 and ad 2, 5; 86. 3; *Quodlibet.*, III, 21; *In I Post. Analyt.*, lect. 30, 41; *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, IX ad 6; *In Librum De Causis*, lect. 10.

<sup>6</sup> In addition to the passages which contain explanations of the knowledge of the singular, and which will be explicitly discussed later, there are many passages which simply state that there is intellectual knowledge of singular material things. *In I Sent.*, d. 38, 1. 3 ad 3; *In IV Sent.*, d. 50, 1. 3 ad 3; *De Ver.*, II. 9; *Contra Gentiles*, II. 47; 59; III. 81; *In III De Anima*, lect. 11 (749); *Summa Theologiae* I: 16. 2; 82. 2; 84. 3 ad 3; 84. 4; 85. 1; 88. 1; 89. 1, 7, 8; 108. 3; 76. 2 ad 3, 4; 79. 9 ad 3; I-II. 14. 6 ad 3; 50. 4; II-II. 20. 2; 47. 15 ad 3; 49. 2 ad 1; 5 ad 2; 88. 12 ad 1. *In I Post. Analyt.*, lect. 38; *In I Peri Hermen.*, lect. 1.

distinguished by their respective properties of particularity and universality; in themselves *universal* and *particular* do not change an essence nor a knowledge, except with reference to the manner of knowing.<sup>7</sup> Secondly, the knowledge of a particular thing cannot be achieved through a mere form or any combination of forms.<sup>8</sup> The reason for this is that

the individuation of a form is from matter by which the form is limited to this determinate being. Consequently, in order that a particular may be known, it is necessary that in the knower there be a likeness, not only of the form, but also of the matter.<sup>9</sup>

In other words, the knower must possess the likeness of the individuating principles<sup>10</sup> or conditions.<sup>11</sup> Note that it is not

<sup>7</sup> Cf. "Ad tertium dicendum quod intellectus, qui singulare cognoscit, alio modo cognoscit quam sensus. Sensus enim singulare cognoscit per formam quodammodo materialem; unde per illam formam non potest se extendere eius cognitio ultra singulare. Sed intellectus singulare cognoscit per formam immaterialem, quae potest esse principium cognoscendi universale et singulare; et sic adhuc remanet differentia inter sensum et intellectum," *In IV Sent.*, d. 50, l. 3 ad 3 (Parma VI. 2, 1250); ". . . universale et particulare non diversificant essentiam neque habitum," *In II Sent.*, d. 26, 2. 4 (Parma VII. 1, 287); ". . . scire in universali et particulari non diversificant scientiam nisi quantum ad modum sciendi, non autem quantum ad rem scitam," *De Veritate* XIV. 21 ad 1.

<sup>8</sup> ". . . formae quae sunt in mente nostra primo et principaliter respiciunt res extra animam existentes quantum ad formas earum," *De Ver.*, X. 4; ". . . additio formae ad formam non potest esse causa individuationis; quia quotcumque formae simul aggregentur, ut album, bicubitum, et crispum, et huiusmodi, non constituunt particulare," *Quodlibet*. VII. 3.

<sup>9</sup> ". . . individuatō formae est ex materia, per quam forma contrahitur ad hoc determinatum. Unde ad hoc quod particulare cognoscatur, oportet quod in cognoscente non solum sit similitudo formae, sed aliquantulum materiae," *Quodlibet*. VII. 3; cf. ". . . oportet enim illam virtutem quae cognoscit singulare habere apud se rei similitudinem, quantum ad conditiones individuantes," *In II Sent.*, d. 3, 3. 3 (Parma VI. p. 424).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. "Si ergo forma per quam fit cognitio sit materialis non abstracta a conditionibus materiae, erit similitudo naturae speciei aut generis, secundum quod est distincta et multiplicata per principia individuantia," *ST* I. 76. 2 (ed. Ottawa, 452b).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. "Oportet enim illam virtutem quae cognoscit singulare habere apud se rei similitudinem, quantum ad conditiones individuantes; et haec est ratio quare per speciem quae est in sensu, cognoscitur singulare, et non per speciem quae est in intellectu," *In II Sent.*, d. 3, 3. 3 (Parma VI, 424b).

necessary that these principles themselves be in the knower, but only that their likenesses be there.<sup>12</sup>

Now, according to St. Thomas, a singular is precisely *this* thing, not just a *thing*.<sup>13</sup> And a thing is known singularly "when it is known as it is here and now."<sup>14</sup> The determinations *here and now* are often called by St. Thomas the "material conditions."<sup>15</sup> We can then say that the knowledge of a material singular thing is a knowledge of that thing under its material conditions.

#### DIRECT AND INDIRECT KNOWLEDGE

The simplest and briefest distinction St. Thomas makes is that between "direct" and "indirect" knowledge, when he tells us, for example, that the intellect "directly knows the universal by the intelligible species, but indirectly, the singulars."<sup>16</sup> Along the same lines, "our intellect, speaking *per se*, does not know singulars, but only universals. . . . But *per accidens* our intellect knows singulars."<sup>17</sup> By the direct or *per se* knowledge, St. Thomas means "through the intelligible species," "by the species which it has received," and so on.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Cf. ". . . distincta cognitio aliquarum rerum non requirit ut apud cognoscentem sint ipsa distinctionis principia, sed sufficit quod apud ipsum sint earum similitudines," *De Ver.*, VIII. 9 ad 4; see also, *ibid.*, VIII. 11 ad 3, 4; X. 4 and ad 4.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. *De Ver.*, X. 5; *ST I.* 14. 11; 57. 2.

<sup>14</sup> ". . . quando cognoscitur prout est hic et nunc," *De Ver.* VIII. 11; cf. *ibid.*, X. 4 ad 6; *ST I.* 86. 1.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. e. g., "sub conditionibus materialibus," *De Ver.* VII. 9; *ST I.* 14. 11 ad 2.

<sup>16</sup> "Sic igitur ipsum universale per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit, indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Et hoc modo format hanc propositionem, 'Socrates est homo,'" *ST I.* 86. 1; other passages which use the terms *directe-indirecte* are: *In IV Sent.*, d. 50. 1 3; *ST I.* 89. 4, *Quodlibet.* XII. 11; *Q. D. De Anima*, 20 ad 1 in *contrar. De Ver.*, II. 6; *Quodlibet.* VII. 3.

<sup>17</sup> ". . . intellectus noster, per se loquendo, singularia non cognoscat, sed universalia tantum. . . . Sed per accidens contingit quod intellectus noster singulare cognoscit," *De Ver.* II. 6.

<sup>18</sup> ". . . cum recta cognitio sit per speciem," *Quodlibet.* XII. 11; cf. *De Ver.* II. 6; *ST I.* 86. 1



In other words, the human intellect, when it is acting according to the way in which it is informed by the intelligible *species*, can know only the universal or absolute nature.<sup>19</sup> This kind of knowledge St. Thomas designates as "direct" or "*per se*" knowledge. But the explanation of the "indirect" or "*per accidens*" knowledge is much more complex.

### CONTINUATIO

The text we have just been reading concludes: "Our intellect . . . has some knowledge of the singular according to a certain *continuatio* of the intellect to the imagination."<sup>20</sup>

The word *continuatio* first had, and still retains, a local sense, according to which it means "an absence of interruption," "unbroken connection," and may be translated as "continuity" or "contact."<sup>21</sup> The word is also used to indicate "uninterrupted time" or "activity."<sup>22</sup>

There are also several transferred or applied senses of *continuatio*. One sense is that of "juxta-position on a scale of

<sup>19</sup> Cf. ". . . actio sequitur conditionem formae agentis. . . . Similitudo autem cogniti, qua informatur potentia cognoscitiva, est principium cognitionis . . . ideo oportet ut quaelibet cognitio sit per modum formae quae est in cognoscente. Unde, cum similitudo rei quae est in intellectu nostro, accipiatur ut separata a materia et ab omnibus materialibus conditionibus . . . relinquatur ut intellectus noster, per se loquendo, singularia non cognoscat," *De Ver.* II. 6.

<sup>20</sup> ". . . intellectus noster . . . habet quamdam cognitionem de singulari secundum continuationem quamdam intellectus ad imaginationem," *ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> For example, ". . . non possunt dicere [Melissus et Parmenides] quod omnia sunt unum continuatione," *In I Physic.*, lect. 3; cf. *In V Metaphys.*, lect. 7 (Cathala, 851); *In X Metaphys.*, lect. 1 (Cathala, 1922); *De Spiritual. Creatur.* 9 ad 12.

This is the classical meaning of the word *continuatio* as given in *Harper's Latin Dictionary*, by Freund and Andrews, revised by Lewis and Short (New York: American Book Company, 1907), p. 450. No special medieval meaning for this term is given either by W. H. Maigne D'Arnis, *Lexicon manuale ad scriptores mediae et infimae Latinitatis* (Paris: Migne), or Charles du Fresne du Cange, *Glossarium mediae et infimae Latinitatis*, ed. by Leopold Favre (Paris: Librairie des Sciences et des Arts, 1937).

<sup>22</sup> For example, "*continuatio operis*," *Contra Gentiles* III. 155.

perfection,"<sup>23</sup> and this is frequently connected in St. Thomas's thought with the Dionysian principle of hierarchy.<sup>24</sup> Another, quite different, sense is that of the "contact" or "union" between the principal cause and its instrument,<sup>25</sup> or between a mover and a thing moved, an agent and a patient.<sup>26</sup> St. Thomas says:

The things which are united in such a contact [*contactus virtutis*] are not simply one. For they are one in acting and undergoing, and this is not being one simply. For a thing is said to be one as it is said to be. But to be an agent does not mean simply to be. Hence, neither is to be one in acting simply to be one.<sup>27</sup>

This "dynamic contact" in operation through causality does not necessarily imply any contact in space; St. Thomas uses it to describe the union of a separated spirit with a material thing.<sup>28</sup> How can the word *contact* be applied to such a non-spatial union?

What "position" is in material things, that "order" is in the spiritual. For position is a certain order of bodily parts according to

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<sup>23</sup> As in *In III Sent.* d. 27, 1. 4 ad 3; d. 35. 1. 2. 2 ad 1; *Contra Gentiles* III. 61.

<sup>24</sup> See *In Lib. Dionysii De Divin. Nomin.*, c. 7, lect. 4 (ed. Ceslaus Pera, O. P. [Turin: Marietti, 1950], no. 733).

<sup>25</sup> For example, "... instrumentum praedicto modo virtutem non accipit nisi secundum quod principali agenti continuatur," *In IV Sent.* d. 1, 1. 4. 3 (Parma VII. 1, 464).

On the unity of the operation of the principal and the instrumental cause, see also *In IV Sent.*, d. 8, 2. 2. 9; *Contra Gentiles* III. 109; IV 56; *In V Metaphys.* lect. 3; *ST* I. 45. 5; 105. 6; III. 19. 1; 62. 1 ad 7, 4 ad 2 and 4; 72. 3 ad 2; 82. 1 ad 1

<sup>26</sup> A lengthy discussion of the union between agent and patient in causality is to be found in *Contra Gentiles* II. 56.

<sup>27</sup> "Quae autem uniuntur secundum talem contactum non sunt unum simpliciter. Sunt enim unum in agendo et patiando; quod est esse unum simpliciter. Sic dicitur unum quomodo et ens. Esse autem agens non significat esse simpliciter. Unde nec esse unum in agendo est esse unum simpliciter," *ibid.*, ed. Leon. man., p. 151a.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. "Tactus autem virtutis qui competit substantiis intellectualibus," *ibid.*



place. And so the order of spiritual substances to each other is enough that one may affect the other.<sup>29</sup>

It is order which brings unity into multiplicity.<sup>30</sup> And among the various powers of the soul there is a three-fold order: that of graded perfection,<sup>31</sup> that of finality,<sup>32</sup> and that of origin.<sup>33</sup>

If we had to discover the meaning of *continuatio* from these meager and very general texts, the specific applications we would make could be as easily questioned as affirmed. But fortunately, *continuatio* is a highly technical term with which both St. Thomas and his readers were familiar.

The Latin term *continuatio* was used to translate the Arabic *ittisāl*,<sup>34</sup> that is, the relation between the agent intellect and the human soul in the act of intellection.<sup>35</sup> This "union" was most fully discussed by Averroes,<sup>36</sup> and it is the Averroistic *continuatio* which St. Thomas most often discusses.<sup>37</sup> According

<sup>29</sup> "Quod autem est in corporalibus situs, est in spiritualibus ordo: nam situs est quidam ordo partium corporalium secundum locum; et ideo ipse ordo substantiarum spiritualium ad invicem sufficit ad hoc quod una influat in alteram," *Quodlibet*. III. 7.

<sup>30</sup> See *In III Sent.* d. 1, 1. 1; *De Pot.* VII. 11; X. 3; *Contra Gentiles*, IV. 35 "Amplius nomen"; *ST* I. 21. 3; II-II. 26. 1; III. 2. 1.

<sup>31</sup> See *In III Sent.* d. 26, 1. 2; *De Ver.* XXV. 2; XIV. 1 ad 9; *Q. D. De Anima*, 11 ad 14; *ST* I. 77. 4; I-II. 74. 3 ad 1.

<sup>32</sup> See *De Ver.* X. 6; XI. 1; *Contra Gentiles*, III. 33; *ST* I. 76. 5; 84. 5; 84. 8, obj. 1 and ad 1.

<sup>33</sup> See *In I Sent.* d. 3, 4. 3; *In II Sent.* d. 24, 1. 2; *ST* I. 77. 7.

<sup>34</sup> "2. Continuité par contact . . . le rapport de l'intellect actif et de l'âme humaine dans l'acte d'intellection," A. M. Goichon, *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sīnā* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1938), no. 775, pp. 434-35.

<sup>35</sup> For a brief account of the acquaintance which the readers of St. Thomas had with this doctrine, see F. Van Steenberghen, "Siger of Brabant," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXIX (1951), 11-27.

<sup>36</sup> The main texts in Averroes are *In III De Anima*, t. 5, VI. 1. 2 (Venice: Juntas, 1574), fol. 147D, 148C; t. 20, fol. 163-65; text. 26, fol. 165E. The term was also used by Avicenna, *De Anima*, part IV, c. 4; and Avempace, referred to by Averroes, "Avempace in epistola sua, quam appellavit Continuationem intellectus cum homine," *In III De Anima*, t. 5; VI. 1. 2, fol. 148C.

<sup>37</sup> St. Thomas once uses the term in connection with the doctrine of

to Averroes, the intellect was a pure spirit, distinct in its substance and being from man. But in the operation of intellection, the intellect and man were conjoined or united, so that there was but one operation. And, in such cases, Averroes tells us,

Every action produced from the bringing together of two distinct principles, it is necessary that one of them be as matter and instrument, and the other as form and [principal] agent.<sup>38</sup>

Averroes goes on to explain that the separated intellect is as form and agent, and the *virtus cogitativa* (or discursive, that is, compositive, imagination) <sup>39</sup> is as matter and instrument.

Against the Averroistic explanation of intellection as an operation flowing from two distinct substances, St. Thomas brings two objections. The first and most commonly used objection is that where there are two substances, both operating, there cannot strictly be only one operation.<sup>40</sup> For this, St. Thomas has an inescapable argument, hinging on the correlation between being and operation.<sup>41</sup> If a being is a distinct supposit, it has its proper nature and hence its proper operation. It is contradictory to suppose that there could be a distinctly existing being which essentially needed completion from the outside in its own order.<sup>42</sup> St. Thomas has a second objection. Averroes, he says, uses "contact" to explain a separated, abstract ac-

Themistius, *In II. Sent.* d. 17, 2. 1 (Parma VI, 534); he discusses the doctrine of Averroes, *ibid.*; *In II Sent.* d. 18, 2. 2; *Contra Gentiles*, III. 43; *De Spirit. Creatur.* 2 and 9; *ST I.* 76. 1; 88. 1; *De Unitate Intellect.* c. 3 (ed. Keeler, nos. 63-66); *Compend. Theol.* c. 85.

<sup>38</sup> "Et omnis actio facta ex congregato duorum diversorum necesse est ut alterum duorum illorum sit quasi materia et instrumentum, et aliud sit quasi forma aut agens," Averroes, *In III De Anima*, t. 36, VI. 1. 2, fol. 184C.

<sup>39</sup> The Averroistic *virtus cogitativa* is the human deliberative imagination, while the Thomistic *vis cogitativa* is the human estimative under the control of reason.

<sup>40</sup> See *De Spirit. Creaturis*, a. 9, a. 2; *In II Sent.* d. 17, 2. 1; *De Unitate Intellectus*, c. III; *Compend. Theologiae*, c. 85; *ST I.* 88. 1.

<sup>41</sup> This argument is developed at length in *ST III.* 19. 1, 2.

<sup>42</sup> Some Platonists admit the incompleteness of the creature in its own order; examples can be found in the "formation" and "illumination" theories of the Augustinians.

tivity.<sup>43</sup> For the Averroistic theory was invented to explain universal, necessary, scientific knowledge.

But when St. Thomas himself uses the notion of *contact* to explain the intellectual knowledge of the material singular, he avoids both of these objections. For the intellect and the imagination are both powers of one and the same substance, and therefore they can together perform one (composite) operation.<sup>44</sup> Secondly, the contact is brought in, not to explain the abstract knowledge of the universal, but the concrete knowledge of the singular. With these corrections, St. Thomas in his earlier writings makes free use of this technical term.<sup>45</sup> Hence, when he says that "our intellect has some knowledge of the singular according to a contact of the intellect with the imagination," he means "according to a conjoined or united operation of both the intellect and the imagination."

After 1259 (the latest probable date for the writing of the *De Veritate*), St. Thomas seems no longer to use the term *contact* in explaining the intellectual knowledge of the singular. A possible reason is that between 1258 and 1261 he wrote the *Contra Gentiles*, in which he devoted a long and detailed criti-

<sup>43</sup> "Videtur etiam in ipsa ratione continuationis defecisse; cum species intelligibilis non sit unum cum intellectu possibili nisi in quantum est abstracta a phantasmatis: sic enim solum est intellecta in actu; secundum autem quod est in phantasmatis, est intellecta solum in potentia. Per hoc igitur magis demonstratur disiunctio intellectus possibilis quam continuatio. Oportet enim illa esse omnino disiuncta, quorum uni aliquid uniri non potest, nisi fuerit ab altero separatum," *De Spirit. Creaturis*, a. 2.

<sup>44</sup> "Si autem intellectus possibilis esset substantia separata, impossibile esset quod eo intelligeret homo: non enim est possibile, si aliqua substantia operatur aliquam operationem, quod illa operatio sit alterius substantiae ab ea diversa; licet enim duarum substantiarum diversarum una possit alteri esse causa operandi ut principale agens instrumento, tamen actio principalis agentis non est actio instrumenti eadem secundum numerum," *Q. D. De Anima*, 2, and compare the last two texts referred to in note 73.

<sup>45</sup> Not only in the explanation of the knowledge of the singular, but in an especial way in explaining the "rational" procedure of the *vis cogitativa*. The latest work in which the term occurs in the explanation of the intellectual knowledge of the singular is the *De Veritate*.

cism to the Averroistic theory. As a result, he may have been disinclined to use the particular term any longer.

### REFLEXIO

From the very earliest texts to the latest, St. Thomas very often uses the term *reflexio* to designate the special act by which the human intellect knows the singular material thing.<sup>46</sup> We may note here that several texts use *reflexio* and *continuatio* interchangeably.<sup>47</sup> It is the merit of the very careful study of P. Wébert to have proved that the psychological *reflexio* is of five kinds, which he calls "réflexion-déviation, -réfraction, -réfluence, -considération, -replôiment."<sup>48</sup> Of these, the first two refer to a knowledge of the singular; the third, to the mutual interaction of intellect and will; the fourth, to the reflection by which we come to know our soul and our intellect; the fifth, to direct self-consciousness. Clearly, we need not here take up the last three.

*Reflexio*, as a technical term in the explanation of the knowledge of the singular, is an Aristotelian term.<sup>49</sup> St. Thomas' *Commentary* is fuller; it will repay study.

<sup>46</sup> *In II Sent.* d. 3, 3. 3 ad 1; *In IV Sent.* d. 50. 1. 3 and ad 2 in contr.; *In lib. Boëthii De Trinitate*, V. 2 ad 4; *In III De Anima*, lect. 8 (Pirota, 713); *De Veritate* II. 6 and ad 3; X. 5 and ad 3; XII. 3 ad 2; XV. 4 ad 5; XIX. 2; *Quodlibet.* VII. 3; XII. 11; *ST* I. 86. 1; II-II. 47. 3 ad 1; *Q. D. De Anima*, 20. ad 1 in contrar.

<sup>47</sup> *In IV Sent.* d. 50, 1. 3 ad 2 in contrar.; *De Ver.* II. 6; X. 5.

<sup>48</sup> J. Wébert, O. P., "Etude sur la 'Reflexio,'" *Mélanges Mandonnet* (Paris: Vrin, 1930; 2 vols.), vol. I, 308-319. Note that *reflexio* is also used by St. Thomas in other senses, not connected with knowledge.

The *Harper's Latin Dictionary* defines *reflexio* as "a bending or turning back," (Lewis and Short edition, p. 1547). It does not give the meaning of "mental consideration" as occurring in classical usage. Neither do du Cange or D'Arnis give any instance of such a meaning. Hence, to translate *reflexio* as "reflection" in a psychological context may be an entirely misleading translation.

<sup>49</sup> As St. Thomas states already in *De Veritate* II. 6.

This is one instance where the study of the Aristotelian source of the term will not clarify St. Thomas' use of it. The text to which St. Thomas

. . . the quiddity of flesh is known by the intellectual power, flesh itself by the sensitive power. This happens when the soul knows the singular *per se*, and *per se* knows the nature of the species. In another way, it happens that flesh and the whatness of flesh are known: not that there are two distinct powers, but that one and the same power, in two distinct ways knows flesh and the whatness of flesh. This latter must be the case, when the soul compares the universal to the singular . . . we could not know the comparison of the universal to the particular, unless there were one power which knew both. Therefore the intellect knows both, but in two ways.

For it knows the nature of the species, or the whatness, directly extending itself; but the singular by a bending back [*reflexio*], inasmuch as it returns to the phantasms from which the intelligible species are abstracted. And this is what [Aristotle] says, that by the sensitive power it knows flesh, "by another," that is by another power "it discerns the essence of flesh" that is, the whatness of flesh, either "by a separated power," for example when flesh is known by the sense, and the essence of flesh by the intellect, or by the same in a different state, that is, "as a bent line is related to itself," the intellective soul knows flesh. And the soul, "when it is extended, discerns the essence of flesh," that is, it directly apprehends the quiddity of flesh, but by being bent back, flesh itself.<sup>50</sup>

There is no reason for thinking that the "bending back" spoken of in this text is a conscious reflection or thinking-back-over. True, St. Thomas does in several texts<sup>51</sup> describe a process of conscious reflection.

The conscious reflection, as a form of knowledge of the singular, is described by St. Thomas as passing from the consideration of an understood object to the intelligible *species* which is the formal principle of the understanding, and then to

refers says: "by means of the sensitive faculty we discriminate the hot and the cold. . . . The essential character of flesh is apprehended by something different either wholly separate from the sensitive faculty or related to it as a bent line to the same line when it has been straightened out," *De Anima*, II, 4; 429b14-16 (translation by J. A. Smith).

<sup>50</sup> *In III De Anima*, lect. 8 (Pirotta, nos. 712-13).

<sup>51</sup> *In IV Sent.* d. 50, l. 3; *De Ver.* X. 5; *Q. D. De Anima*, 20 ad 1 in contrar.

the phantasm which was the instrumental principle of the *species*. That such a process is possible and of occasional occurrence is true. Because of its formal nature, we may well call it the "scientific knowledge of the singular," or, more briefly, "scientific reflection." In P. Wébert's terms, it is a "réflexion-réfraction."

The other *reflexio* texts make no mention of such an involved and formal process. They say simply that *per quamdam reflexionem* the intellect knows the singular, inasmuch as it returns to the phantasm or to sense. Why does St. Thomas speak of a *re-flexio* or a return? There seems to be a sufficient reason for speaking of a "return," because there has been a line of causality from the phantasm to the intellect, and the process which brings the intellect to the phantasm brings it *back* to its point of origin.

However, it would seem that *reflexio* tells us little more than the *indirecte* or *per accidens* expressions which we studied earlier.

#### APPLICATIO

Another term which occurs rather frequently in the texts is *applicatio*. Thus, St. Thomas says:

. . . singulars which are individuated by matter are not known [through the intelligible *species*] except by a certain bending back of the intellect to the imagination and sense, that is, the intellect applies [*applicat*] the universal species which it has abstracted from singulars to the singular form retained in the imagination.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> ". . . ideo ex eis [speciebus a rebus receptis] singularia non cognoscuntur quae individuantur per materiam nisi per reflexionem quamdam intellectus ad imaginationem et sensum, dum scilicet intellectus speciem universalem quam a singularibus abstraxit applicat formae singulari in imaginatione servatae," *In II Sent.* d. 3, 3. 3 ad 1 (Parma VI, 425a).

A similar usage can be found in *Quodlibet*. VII. 3 ad 2. A transferred usage is also to be found, as in *ST II-II*. 47. 3 ad 3, where St. Thomas says: "Non tamen ita quod prudentia sit in sensu interiori sicut in subiecto principali, sed principaliter quidem est in ratione, per quamdam autem applicationem pertingit ad huiusmodi sensum," (Ottawa, 1667a).

In this text, *applicare* seems to mean "to join or connect,"<sup>53</sup> and is used as an explanatory synonym for the "bending back" spoken of in the previous phrase. In another passage, *applicare* suggests a process similar to if not identical with the "scientific reflection" which we have seen above.<sup>54</sup> St. Thomas uses the term in still another way in comparing the first and second acts of the mind. He says that the understanding of an essence involves abstraction from material conditions. But judgment takes place by applying (*applicando*) the intelligibles previously abstracted to things.<sup>55</sup> Here, the word seems to mean "connecting" or "referring"; this meaning is similar to the first used above, except that it is here used in the context of the acts of the mind, rather than simply of objects.

The majority of *applicatio* texts, however, explain the practical knowledge of the singular.<sup>56</sup> Concerning this sense of *appli-*

<sup>53</sup> The Lewis and Short revision of the Freund-Andrews *Harper's Latin Dictionary* gives the pertinent meanings for *applicare*: "join, bring near, connect with" (p. 142). D'Arnis and du Cange list as a special medieval meaning, "sibi vindicare," which does not seem pertinent here. None of the three gives anything like "employment in a particular case," which is the meaning of the term *application*.

<sup>54</sup> "Ad quartum dicendum quod scientia est de aliquo dupliciter: uno modo primo et principaliter, et sic scientia est de rationibus universalibus, super quas fundatur; alio modo est de aliquibus secundario et quasi per reflexionem quamdam, et sic de illis rebus, quarum sunt illae rationes, in quantum illas rationes applicat ad res etiam particulares, quarum sunt, adminiculo inferiorum virium," *In lib. Boethii de Trinitate*, V. 2 ad 4 (ed. Wyser, p. 35).

<sup>55</sup> "Componit autem aut dividit applicando intelligibilia prius abstracta ad res: et in hac applicatione necesse est co-intelligi tempus," *Contra Gentiles*, II. 96 (ed. Leonine man., 219-220); cf. ". . . quia in anima intellectiva recipitur aliquid abstractum ab omnibus conditionibus materialibus individuantes, ideo nulla apprehensio intellectiva concernit aliquid tempus determinate, quamvis possit esse de quolibet tempore; unde in componendo et dividendo implicat tempus," *In III Sent.* d. 26, l. 5 ad 4 (ed. Mandonnet-Moos, vol. 3, pp. 829-30).

<sup>56</sup> Cf. "Ad tertium dicendum quod intellectus practicus ad hoc quod de singularibus disponit, ut dicitur tertio *De Anima* [434a17-20], indiget ratione particulari qua mediante opinio quae est universalis quae est in intellectu ad particulare opus applicetur," *In IV Sent.* d. 50, l. 3 ad 3 in

*catio*, that is "the application of universal knowledge to particular cases," St. Thomas has two instructive comments. In the *De Veritate*, he tells us that the contact between the intellect and the sense powers is of two kinds: (a) the (scientific) reflection and (b) the application to action.

Yet the mind incidentally concerns itself with singulars, inasmuch as it touches the sensitive powers which deal with singulars. This contact is of two kinds. In one way, inasmuch as the motion of the sensitive part terminates at the mind, as is the case in the motion from things to the soul, and in this way the mind knows the singular by a certain bending back. . . . In another way, according as the motion which is from the soul to things begins in the mind and proceeds to the sensitive part, according as the mind rules the lower powers. In this way the mind puts itself in the midst of singular things, by means of the "particular reason," which is an individual potency, also called *cogitativa*. . . . But the universal judgment which the mind has about operables cannot be applied to a particular act except through some potency apprehending the singular. Thus, there is a kind of syllogism, whose major is universal (and this is the judgment of the mind); whose minor is singular (and this is the application of the "particular reason"); whose conclusion is the choice of a singular effect [*opus*, that is, a thing or an action], as is clear by what is said in the third book of the *De Anima*. But the angelic mind, because it knows material things through forms which immediately regard the matter as well as the form, not only knows matter in general by a direct inspection, but also in particular.<sup>57</sup>

Notice, in the course of this text, that it is the *mind* itself which deals with singulars, and that it does this by means of (*mediante*) or through (*per*), and inasmuch as it rules (*regit*), the lower powers.<sup>58</sup> Thus, the acts of the various powers are

contrar. (Parma VI. 2, 1251). The same idea is to be found in *In II Sent.* d. 24, 2. 4 (with a reference to *Ethics*, V, c. 8); *De Veritate*, II. 6 ad 3, 4; X. 5; *In III De Anima*, lect. 16 (Pirota, no. 846); *In VI Ethic.* lect. 6 (ed. Pirota, 1194); *ST* II-II. 47. 1 ad 3; 2 ad 3; 3 ad 1; 8 and ad 2; 16 and ad 3; 49. 1 ad 1; 2 ad 1.

<sup>57</sup> *De Veritate*, X. 5.

<sup>58</sup> In the later works especially the *Summa Theologiae*, the doctrine of the



somehow unified, though in St. Thomas's earlier writings there is no clear indication of the kind of unity present here.

A second and later text reminds us that the application which we find in practical knowledge cannot strictly speaking be the reason why the intellect first knows the singular; rather, it presupposes that the intellect already has a (speculative) knowledge of the singular, to which the principles are to be applied.

I answer. It is to be said, as was already said above, that to prudence there belongs not only a consideration of reason, but also the application to the task which is the end of the practical reason. But no one can suitably apply one thing to another unless he knows both, that is, both that which is to be applied, and that to which something is to be applied. But operations are among singular things. And so it is necessary that the prudent man knows both the universal principles of reason, and the singulars with which operation deals.

In reply to the first. It is to be said that reason, in the first instance and principally, is of universals. Yet it can apply universal reasons to particulars. Consequently, the conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but also particular, because the intellect, by a certain bending back, is extended to matter, as is said in the *De Anima* (429b16).<sup>59</sup>

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unity of the imperium and the commanded act is clearly expressed, and given technical explanation cf. "The Unity of Human Activity," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXVII (1950), 85-89.

<sup>59</sup> "Respondeo. Dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, ad prudentiam pertinet non solum consideratio rationis, sed etiam applicatio ad opus quod est finis practicae rationis. Nullus autem potest convenienter alteri aliquid applicare nisi utrumque cognoscat, scilicet et id quod applicandum est et id cui applicandum est. Operationes autem sunt in singularibus. Et ideo necesse est quod prudens et cognoscat universalia principia rationis, et cognoscat singularia, circa quae sunt operationes.

"Ad primum ergo. Dicendum quod ratio primo quidem et principaliter est universalium; potest tamen universales rationes ad particularia applicare; unde syllogismorum conclusiones non solum sunt universales, sed etiam particulares, quia intellectus per quandam reflexionem se ad materiam extendit, ut dicitur in III *De Anima* [429b16]," *ST* II-II. 47. 3 and ad 1 (Ottawa, 1866b).

Compare *Quodlibet*. VII. 3, where the second objection gives the position of the response of this article, and the reply takes up the first meaning of *applicare* given above.

## OTHER TERMS

In addition to the technical terms which occur several times, St. Thomas also uses a number of less technical expressions. Of these, perhaps the most difficult is the phrase, "The intellect knows the things which are in matter . . . in another way, that is, by extension, inasmuch as it is conjoined (*coniungitur*) to the phantasm."<sup>60</sup> The phrase, "by extension,"<sup>61</sup> is fortunately explained in this text as the conjoining of the intellect to the phantasm. The term *coniunctio* and its cognates appear in the Latin translation of Avicenna,<sup>62</sup> where they stand for *ittisāl*, the special mode of contact between the agent intellect and the human mind.<sup>63</sup> St. Thomas, in discussing the Averroistic theory, uses *coniunctio* as a synonym for *continuatio* (along with *unio*).<sup>64</sup> Hence *coniunctio* can mean a "contact in operation," of the kind which we have seen before.<sup>65</sup> (The term *adiunctio*,

<sup>60</sup> ". . . intellectus . . . quae sunt in materia . . . cognoscat . . . alio modo, scilicet per extensionem, in quantum coniungitur phantasiae," *Quodlibet*. XII. 11 (Parma, IX, 623).

<sup>61</sup> For another instance of this expression, see *ST* II-II. 47. 3 ad 1, quoted above, in note 59.

Compare the similar expression, "sola extensio ad opus facit aliquem intellectum esse practicum," *De Veritate* XIV. 4; "intellectus speculativus fit practicus per extensionem ad opus," *In III Sent.* d. 23, 3. 3. 2 (Parma VII. 1, 250b).

<sup>62</sup> Avicenna, *De Anima*, I, c. 5 (ed. Venetiis, 1508: fol. 5vb, l. 55; ed. G. P. Klubertanz, S. J., [Saint Louis: 1949], p. 24, ll. 11-12), "aliquo modo coniunctionis."

<sup>63</sup> See Goichon, *Lerique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sīnā*, p. 435, no. 775; *eadem*, *La Distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sīnā* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1937), p. 320, note 4.

<sup>64</sup> "coniunctio et continuatio," *In II Sent.*, d. 17, 2. 1; "ista continuatio vel unio," *ST* I. 76. 1; "per continuationem vel unionem," *ST* I. 88. 1.

<sup>65</sup> "Coniunctio significat actionem vel passionem . . . si accipiatur coniunctio pro ipsa relatione," *In IV Sent.* d. 44, 1. 1. 2 ad 2.

*Coniunctio* is used in two senses in one passage: "Ad septimum dicendum, quod quamvis intellectus sit absolutus a corpore quantum ad propriam operationem, quae corporali organo non expletur, tamen coniunctionem habet ad corpus dupliciter: scilicet ex parte essentiae animae, quae

used once, seems to be just a variant of *coniunctio*).<sup>66</sup> In some related contexts (still within the area of knowledge), *coniunctio* designates the reason for the rationally modified sensory activity of man.<sup>67</sup>

Several phrases point out the sense powers as mediate causes in the knowledge of the material singular. St. Thomas says that science concerns the singular, "with the help of the lower powers."<sup>68</sup> In several passages, he expresses this idea thus: "by the mediation of the sensory powers."<sup>69</sup> Finally, this same idea is expressed, more vaguely and implicitly, by the preposition "through, *per*."<sup>70</sup> These last texts would by no means be con-

forma corporis est, et ex parte inferiorum potentiarum, ex quibus intellectus recipit," *In II Sent.* d. 32, 2. 3 ad 7 (Parma VI, 683).

<sup>66</sup> "Sed haec reflexio compleri non potest nisi per adiunctionem virtutis cogitativae et imaginativae," *Q. D. De Anima*, 20, ad 1 in contrar.

<sup>67</sup> Cf. ". . . sicut pars sensitiva ex coniunctione ad intellectum efficitur virtuosior, ita phantasmata ex virtute intellectus agentis redduntur habilia ut ab eis intentiones intelligibiles abstrahantur," *ST I.* 85. 1 ad 4 (Ottawa, 526a); ". . . pars illa [sensitiva secundum quod attingit rationem] in hominibus, in quibus est perfectior propter coniunctionem ad animam rationalem, dicitur ratio particularis," *In III Sent.* d. 26, 1. 2 (Parma, VII. 1, 279a); "Nam cogitativa apprehendit individuum ut existens sub natura communi, quod contingit ei in quantum unitur intellectivae in eodem subiecto," *In II De Anima*, lect. 13 (Pirota, 398).

<sup>68</sup> "adminiculo inferiorum virium," *In lib. Boethii De Trinitate*, V. 2 ad 4 (quoted above, note 54).

<sup>69</sup> ". . . Ex universali autem propositione directe non potest concludi singularis, nisi mediante aliqua singulari propositione assumpta. Unde universalis ratio intellectus practici non movet nisi mediante particulari apprehensione sensitivae partis," *ST I.* 86. 1 ad 2. The same expression is to be found in *In IV Sent.* d. 50, 1. 3 ad 3 in contrar. (Parma VII. 2, 1251); see also, "mediantibus phantasmatis," *ST II-II.* 175. 4, and "Alio modo possunt accipi contingentia secundum quod sunt in particulari, et sic variabilia sunt nec cadit supra ea intellectus nisi mediantibus potentiis sensitivis," *In VI Ethic.* lect. 1 (Pirota, 1123).

<sup>70</sup> Cf. ". . . aedificator per artem suam cognoscit quidem domum in universali, non autem hanc vel illam, nisi secundum quod per sensum eius notitiam habet," *De Veritate*, II. 5; so also *In I Sent.* d. 36, 1. 1; *In II Sent.* d. 3, 3. 3; *Quodlibet.* VII. 3; ". . . quamdiu est anima in corpore, non potest intelligere sine phantasmate: nec etiam reminisci nisi per virtutem cogitativam et memorativam," *Contra Gentiles*, II. 81 (ed. Leon. man., 192); ". . . singularia non cognoscuntur nisi dum sunt sub sensu vel imaginatione," *In VII Metaphys.* lect. 10 (ed. Cathala, 1495).

clusive of themselves alone; they are included here because of the texts which state the situation explicitly, and because St. Thomas himself explicitly says that *per* indicates a "cause or principle of an action," and that this is often an instrumental cause.<sup>71</sup>

For the sake of completeness, we may add the terms which appear in related contexts, especially those dealing with rationally modified sensory or external activity: participation,<sup>72</sup> influence, help,<sup>73</sup> government or rule and subjection.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>71</sup> *Per* means a cause of the action (*ST* I. 36. 3), sometimes an instrument of the action (*ibid.*, ad 4); one of its specialized meanings is to indicate an intermediate cause, that is, between the principal cause and the action (*ST* I. 39. 8, 45. 6 ad 2).

<sup>72</sup> Cf. "Manifestum est enim quod vires sensitivae non sunt rationales per essentiam, sed solum per participationem, ut dicitur in *I Ethic.*," *ST* I-II. 50. 4 (Ottawa, 974b); the same is said *In I Ethic.* lect. 20 (Pirota, 241, 243, 244), and *Q. D. De Anima*, 9. A closely related and very important text says: "Ad nonum dicendum quod potentia cogitativa est quod est altissimum in parte sensitiva, ubi attingit quodammodo ad partem intellectivam ut aliquid participet eius quod est in intellectiva parte infimum, scilicet rationis discursum, secundum regulam Dionysii, *De Divinis Nominibus* [c. 7], quod principia secundorum coniunguntur finibus primorum," *De Veritate* XIV. 1 ad 9.

However, participation sometimes means merely the possession of a perfection in a lesser degree, as when the sensitive nature is considered "secundum quod participat aliquid de natura superioris quamvis deficienter," *In III Sent.* d. 26, l. 2 (Parma VII. 1, 279a).

<sup>73</sup> Cf. "Ad secundum. Dicendum quod ex illa ratione habetur quod prudentia adiuvet omnes virtutes et in omnibus operetur. Sed hoc non sufficit ad ostendendum quod non sit virtus specialis, quia nihil prohibet in aliquo genere esse aliquam speciem quae aliquo modo operetur in omnibus speciebus eiusdem generis; sicut sol aliquo modo influit in omnia corpora," *ST* II-II. 47. 5 ad 2 (Ottawa, 1668b); "Ad quintum. Dicendum quod illam eminentiam habet cogitativa et memorativa in homine . . . per aliquam affinitatem et propinquitatem ad rationem universalem, secundum quandam refluentiam," *ST* 78. 4 ad 5 (Ottawa 479a); "Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod secundum naturae ordinem, propter colligantiam virium animae in una essentia, et animae et corporis in uno esse compositi, vires superiores et inferiores, et etiam corpus, invicem in se effluunt," *De Veritate*, XXVI. 10; ". . . actum voluntatis percipit per redundantiam motus voluntatis in intellectu, ex hoc quod colligantur in una essentia animae, et secundum quod voluntas quodammodo movet intellectum, dum intelligo quia volo; et

## PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE SINGULAR

It was an accepted principle in the Middle Ages that reason or intellect and science are of universals, whereas the senses are of singulars. Though this principle is accepted by St. Thomas in general,<sup>75</sup> he found it necessary to make a number of distinctions and limitations. We have already seen that (a) the sciences of sensible things are ultimately about singulars, though not precisely as singular;<sup>76</sup> and (b) indirectly, with the aid of sensitive powers, the human intellect can know material singulars as singular. We must now consider several further distinctions.

The noun *intellectus* and the verb *intelligere* are used in two ways. In the wider sense, they mean the power of intellect and any or all of its operations. In the narrower sense, they mean "an understanding" and "to understand" in the sense of the

*intellectus voluntatem, dum volo aliquid quia intelligo illud esse bonum," In III Sent. d. 23, l. 2 ad 3 (Parma VII. 1, 241a).*

<sup>74</sup> Cf. "Ad quartum dicendum, quod intellectus sive ratio cognoscit in universali finem ad quem ordinat actum concupiscibilis et actum irascibilis imperando eos. Hanc autem cognitionem universalem mediante vi cogitativa ad singularia applicat ut dictum est," *De Veritate*, X. 5 ad 4; ". . . vires sensitivae dupliciter possunt considerari: uno modo, secundum quod operantur ex instinctu naturae; alio modo, secundum quod operantur ex imperio rationis," *ST* I-II. 50. 3; compare also ad 1, 2, 3 (Ottawa, 973), *In I Ethic.* lect. 20 (Pirota, 240); *Q. D. De Anima*, 13 ad 13, *ST* I-II. 74. 3; "virtus autem moralis quae est in irrationali parte animae eam facit esse rationi subiectam," *ST* III. 15. 2 (Ottawa, 2518); "obedibiles rationi," *ST* III. 15. 2 ad 1; "Respondeo. Dicendum quod prudentia in ratione est. Regere autem et gubernare proprie rationis est. Et ideo unusquisque in quantum participat de regimine et gubernatione, in quantum convenit sibi habere rationem et prudentiam. . . . Ad tertium. Dicendum quod per prudentiam homo non solum praecipit aliis, sed etiam sibi ipsi, prout scilicet ratio dicitur praecipere inferioribus viribus," *ST* II-II. 47. 12 and ad 3 (Ottawa, 1674); "in dirigendo alias vires," *ST* I-II. 74. 5 ad 1 (Ottawa, 1120).

<sup>75</sup> See the texts noted above, in n. 4; see also *ST* I. 59. 1 ad 1; 82. 2, obj. 2; 85. 3; *Contra Gentiles*, I. 44; *In I Post. Analyt.* lect. 42 (ed. Leonine, no. 7), lect. 16.

<sup>76</sup> See the texts listed above, n. 5.

first act of the mind, apprehension, conception.” The significance of this limitation becomes clear if we compare the inevitable abstractness of purely conceptual understanding with the possible concreteness of the judgment.<sup>78</sup>

Furthermore, St. Thomas points out a two-fold knowledge of the singular and of the universal.

For natural science is not only about necessary and incorruptible things, but also about corruptible and contingent things. Hence it is clear that contingent things, considered in this way, pertain to the same part of the intellectual soul as the necessary. . . . Contingent things can be taken in another way, according as they are in particular. In this way, they are variable, and the intellect does not consider them except through the mediation of the sensitive powers.<sup>79</sup>

It is to be remembered that the universal can be taken in two ways. In one way, as it is in itself; for example, if we say “Dry foods are good for every man.” In another way, according as it is in particular; for example, if we say “This man, or this food is dry.” . . . [this is] a universal considered in this singular.<sup>80</sup>

In the *Summa Theologiae*, St. Thomas ties in the knowledge of the singular with complete intellectual knowledge.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. “. . . ‘intelligere,’ id est simplex apprehensio ‘et considerare,’ id est operatio intellectus quae est in componendo et dividendo,” *In I De Anima*, lect. 10 (Pirotta, 164); “Intellectus enim habet iudicare, et hoc dicitur sapere; et apprehendere, et hoc dicitur intelligere,” *ibid.*, III, lect. 4 (Pirotta, 629); “Nam sapere pertinet ad iudicium intellectus, intelligere autem ad eius apprehensionem,” *ibid.*, lect. 7 (Pirotta, 672).

<sup>79</sup> See the text quoted in note 55, and the argumentation below.

<sup>80</sup> “Non enim scientia naturalis solum est de rebus necessariis et incorruptibilibus, sed etiam de rebus corruptibilibus et contingentibus. Unde patet quod contingentia sic considerata ad eandem partem animae intellectivae pertinent ad quam et necessaria [quam Philosophus vocat hic scientificum, et sic procedunt rationes inductae]. Alio modo possunt accipi contingentia secundum quod sunt in particulari: et sic variabilia sunt nec cadit supra ea intellectus nisi mediantibus potentiis sensitivis,” *In VI Ethic.* lect. 1 (Pirotta, 1123).

<sup>80</sup> “Sciendum tamen quod dupliciter potest accipi universale. Uno quidem modo prout est in seipso; puta si dicamus quod omni homini conferunt sicca. Alio modo secundum quod est in singulari; puta si dicamus quod iste homo vel talis cibus est siccus . . . universale consideratum in hoc singulari,” *In VII Ethic.* lect. 3 (Pirotta, 1339-40).

. . . the nature of a stone or of any other material thing, cannot be known completely and truly, unless it is known as existing in the particular. But we apprehend the particular through sense and imagination. Hence, it is necessary, in order that the intellect may actually understand its proper object, that it turn to the phantasms, to see the universal nature existing in a particular.<sup>81</sup>

There seems to be no earlier text which clearly enunciates this position, though there are some slight indications in other passages.<sup>82</sup>

Finally, there is a distinction of major importance. The knowledge of singulars as such does not conduce to the perfection of speculative intellectual knowledge,<sup>83</sup> but it is absolutely necessary for the perfection of practical knowledge.

. . . the knowledge of singulars does not pertain to the perfection of the intellectual soul according to speculative knowledge. But it does pertain to its perfection according to practical knowledge, which is not perfect without the knowledge of singulars with which action deals, as is said in the sixth book of the *Ethics* (1141b14).<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> “. . . natura lapidis vel cuiuscumque materialis rei cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem: et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum obiectum proprium quod convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur universalem in particulari existentem,” *ST I.* 84. 7 (Ottawa, 522a).

<sup>82</sup> Cf. “Item. Cognitio speculativa magis perficitur in universali quam in particulari. . . Ille vero perfectior est in scientia speculativa qui non solum universalem, sed propriam cognitionem de rebus habet. . . Multo igitur magis in scientia practica perfectior est qui non solum in universali, sed etiam in particulari res disponit ad actum,” *Contra Gentiles*, III. 75 (ed. Leon. man, 312); “Nam intelligere aliquid in communi, et non in speciali, est imperfecte aliquid cognoscere. Unde intellectus noster, dum de potentia in actum reducitur, pertingit prius ad cognitionem universalem et confusam de rebus, quam ad propriam rerum cognitionem,” *ST I.* 14. 6 (Ottawa, 97a); and a series of texts which speak of seeing or understanding “species intelligibiles in phantasmatis,” *Contra Gentiles*, II. 73; *ST I.* 84. 7; 85. 1 ad 5; 86. 1; III. 11, 2 ad 1; cf. also *Quodlibet*. XII. 12.

<sup>83</sup> Cf. “. . . in singularibus, quae non per se pertinent ad cognitionem intelligibilem,” *Q. D. De Anima*, 18 ad 1; also ad 10, ad 16.

<sup>84</sup> “. . . cognitio singularium non pertinet ad perfectionem animae intellectivae secundum cognitionem speculativam; pertinet tamen ad perfec-

From the same basically Aristotelian point of view, St. Thomas gives the reason for this difference.

For it is not a great thing, nor does it contribute much to the perfection of the intellect, that someone knows the changeable truth of contingent operable things.<sup>85</sup>

We must consider that, because the knowledge of contingent things cannot possess a certitude of truth which excludes error, therefore, as far as knowledge alone is concerned, contingent things are overlooked by the intellect which is perfected by the knowledge of truth. But the knowledge of contingent things is useful, inasmuch as it directs human activity which deals with singulars. . . . Hence, only the practical sciences deal with contingent things inasmuch as they are contingent, that is, in particular.<sup>86</sup>

With this in mind, it is possible to see why St. Thomas often says that the (speculative) intellect does not know material singulars. For example, a chemist, may conduct an experiment on a piece of lead. What he knows is indeed a singular. But he is not particularly interested in its singularity, certainly not in the way in which a ballistics expert would be interested. On the other hand, a lawyer, a business consultant, a personal adviser, need to know all the particular circumstances before they can give a true judgment. Practical knowledge is simply imperfect in its own order unless it includes a knowledge of the singular in its singularity.

tionem eius secundum cognitionem practicam, quae non perficitur absque cognitione singularium, in quibus est operatio, ut dicitur in VI *Ethic.*," *ST* III. 11. 1 ad. 3 (Ottawa, 2498a); cf. *Contra Gentiles*, I. 65; *ST* I-II. 6, divisio quaestionis (Ottawa, 751b); *Contra Gentiles*, III. 75.

<sup>85</sup> "Non enim magnum quid est, nec multum pertinens ad perfectionem intellectus, quod aliquis cognoscat variabilem veritatem contingentium operabilium," *In II Ethic.* lect. 2 (Pirota, 256).

<sup>86</sup> "Est autem considerandum quod quia contingentium cognitio non potest habere certitudinem veritatis repellentem falsitatem, ideo quantum ad solam cognitionem pertinet, contingentia praetermittuntur ab intellectu qui perficitur per cognitionem veritatis. Est autem utilis contingentium cognitio secundum quod est directiva humanae operationis quae circa contingentia est. . . . Unde et solum scientiae practicae sunt circa contingentia in quantum contingentia sunt, scilicet in particulare," *In VI Ethic.* lect. 3 (Pirota, 1152).



The same conclusion can be reached if we consider the finality of speculative and practical knowledge. Practical knowledge has an end distinct from itself, namely, an action or a thing to be done. But actions and material things in their physical existence are always singular. Hence, practical knowledge is directed toward the singular, of its very nature. Speculative knowledge, on the other hand, is directed toward the intelligibility of a thing; thus, it is its own end, and not merely a means to something outside itself. Now, this situation does not necessarily orient speculative knowledge toward universality. But in view of the structure of material being and its relation to human knowing, there is a definite bias toward the universal in material things.<sup>87</sup> In this particular, modern natural science primarily and principally pursues the universal—hypothesis, law, and theory rather than essence—and shows the same lack of interest in the idiosyncrasy of the individual that its non-mathematical predecessors showed.

#### ONE OPERATION OF TWO POWERS

In a previous article, I investigated the doctrine of St. Thomas on "The Unity of Human Activity."<sup>88</sup> From a study of the formation of the virtues by charity, the unity of the imperium and the commanded act, the composite structure of the imperium itself and of choice (election), the following

<sup>87</sup> See the texts referred to above in notes 4, 8, 9, 17, 19. Cf. ". . . Illa quorum est definitio cognoscuntur per suam definitionem; sed singularia non cognoscuntur nisi dum sunt sub sensu vel imaginatione. . . . Ratio autem huius est, quia materia, quae principium est individuationis, est secundum se ignota, et non cognoscitur nisi per formam, a qua sumitur ratio universalis. Et ideo singularia non cognoscuntur in sua absentia nisi per universalis," *In VII Metaphys.* lect. 10 (Cathala, no. 1495, 96).

<sup>88</sup> In *The Modern Schoolman*, XXVII (1950), 75-103. To the texts quoted and referred to there, add: "Una autem actio non est duorum nisi unum eorum comparetur ad alterum sicut agens ad instrumentum vel sicut forma ad materiam," *Contra Gentiles*, III. 43 (ed. Leon. man., 270a); ". . . idem actus non potest aequaliter, et eodem ordine, pertinere ad diversas potentias, sed secundum diversas rationes, et diverso ordine," *ST I-II. 56. 2 ad 1*; cf. corp.

conclusions emerged. According to St. Thomas, these operations are composite: that is, though they are really one, they are composed of parts really distinct as parts: these parts are related as matter and form; each part is due to a distinct power (or habit, if it is question of the virtues) as eliciting principle. Consequently, the powers (and habits) concerned are themselves related as matter and form (and as principal and instrumental cause). The conditions under which such composite activity can take place are (a) that the powers in question are the powers of one single substance with one proper act of existing; and (b) that the powers have a unity of order to each other.

These conclusions are borne out in our particular context of the knowledge of the singular. The intellectual and sensory knowledges are operations of one and the same existing composite.<sup>89</sup> Intellect and sense are unified by a three-fold order.<sup>90</sup>

Secondly; the habits of the intellect and of the imagination (or the discursive estimative power in relation to practical knowledge) are related to each other as form and matter.

The habits of science acquired in this life are necessarily partly in the aforesaid sensitive powers and partly in the intellect itself. And we can consider this from the acts by which the habit of science is acquired. . . . But the acts of the intellect by which science is acquired in this life take place through a turning of the intellect to the phantasms which reside in the sensitive powers mentioned above. Consequently, by these acts, a certain facility is acquired by the possible intellect for consideration by means of received species; and in the lower powers already mentioned a certain skill is acquired, so that the intellect can more easily look at intelligibles by turning to these powers. But as the act of the intellect is principally and formally in the intellect itself, materially and dispositively in the lower powers, so, too, the same must be said about the habit.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> See, among others, the texts referred to in note 42, and add *ST* I. 76. 1, 3, 4, 5; and the remarkable text on the unity of man, *Quodlibet*. VII. 11 ad 3.

<sup>90</sup> See above, notes 31, 32, 33.

<sup>91</sup> “. . . oportet quod habitus scientiae hic acquisitae partim sit in

The intellective habit can be secondarily in these [sensory] powers. But it is principally in the possible intellect.<sup>92</sup>

Prudence is not in the interior sense [that is, in the powers perfected by experience, namely, the discursive estimative and memorative powers] as in its principal subject; it is principally in reason, and by a kind of connection [*applicatio*] it reaches even to this sense.<sup>93</sup>

Though this doctrine has not been stated in the early works, there can be no doubt that by the time of the *Summa* St. Thomas had made it an important part of his psychology.

An action by the powers that stand in the relation just mentioned, inasmuch as they stand in such a relation, is really one undivided action, composed of real parts.

praedictis viribus sensitivis et partim in ipso intellectu. Et hoc potest considerari ex ipsis actibus ex quibus habitus scientiae acquiritur. . . . Actus autem intellectus ex quibus in praesenti vita scientia acquiritur sunt per conversionem intellectus ad phantasmata, quae sunt in praedictis viribus sensitivis. Unde per tales actus et ipsi intellectui possibili acquiritur facultas quaedam ad considerandum per species susceptas; et in praedictis inferioribus viribus acquiritur quaedamabilitas ut facilius per conversionem ad ipsas intellectus possit intelligibilia speculari. Sed sicut actus intellectus principaliter quidem et formaliter est in ipso intellectu, materialiter autem et dispositive in inferioribus, idem etiam dicendum est de habitu," *ST* I. 89. 5 (Ottawa, 554b); cf. 84. 7; 85. 1 ad 5.

<sup>92</sup>" . . . habitus intellectivus secundario potest esse in istis viribus. Principaliter autem est in intellectu possibili," *ST* I-II. 50. 4 ad 3 (Ottawa, 975a); cf. "Quantum ad ipsa phantasmata, quae sunt quasi materialia in virtutibus intellectualibus, virtutes intellectuales destruuntur destructo corpore; sed quantum ad species intelligibiles . . . manent. Species autem se habent in virtutibus intellectualibus sicut formales. Unde intellectuales virtutes manent post hanc vitam quantum ad id quod est formale in eis, non autem quantum ad id quod est materiale," *ST* I-II. 67. 2 (Ottawa, 1061b); cf. also, *ST* I-II. 51. 4, 53. 1; I. 75. 3 ad 2.

<sup>93</sup>" Non tamen ita quod prudentia sit in sensu interiori sicut in subiecto principali, sed principaliter quidem est in ratione, per quamdam autem applicationem pertingit ad huiusmodi sensum," *ST* II-II. 47. 3 ad 3 (Ottawa, 1667a); cf. I-II. 56. 5; cf. on the moral virtues, *ibid.* I-II. 67. 1 and ad 3.

## CONCLUSIONS

## I. The Solution of the Historical Problem

In the light of these various texts, the problem of St. Thomas' expression and meaning can readily be solved. Clearly, there is no "master text" in which St. Thomas explicitly and fully handles all that he has to say about the intellectual knowledge of the material singular. But out of a large mass of texts, the following summary propositions emerge. First, *intellectus* and *intelligere*, when they are used to designate simply the first act of the intellect (that is, the concept or simple apprehension), can grasp only the absolute nature or essence of material things, but not the material singular. Secondly, speculative demonstrative knowledge (*scientia*) is ordinarily unconcerned with the singularity of the material singular. Practical knowledge, on the contrary, is imperfect unless it attains the singular in its particularity. Thirdly, when the human intellect acts according to its separation from matter, it cannot attain the material singular. Fourthly, when the human intellect acts together with the sense powers, performing with these powers an actually undivided, composite operation, it attains the material, existing singular in a judgment or a reasoning process (and consequently also in such conceptions as presuppose for their formation perceptual judgments). Fifthly, if the intellectual knowledge of the material singular is a speculative one, the sense power immediately concerned is the imagination; if the intellectual knowledge is practical, the sense power is the discursive estimative (*vis cogitativa*).

Before we leave the text of St. Thomas, it may be well to include his statements on the Divine knowledge of sensible things. The Divine Intellect does not know prime matter as such, but this causes no difficulty, because prime matter does

not exist as such.<sup>94</sup> But God does know even prime matter as it exists, that is, inasmuch as matter is a part of a real composite.<sup>95</sup> St. Thomas here consciously takes a stand against the Greek immaterialism,<sup>96</sup> to assert, on the basis of the proved total origin of material creatures from God, that all being is ultimately intelligible. The limited unintelligibility of matter for the human intellect is due to the way in which we know, that is, by means of intelligible *species* which arise from sensible things. But God, Who has created these things, knows them inasmuch as even the lowest of them is a defective likeness of His infinitely intelligible being. Hence, in St. Thomas's universe, no thing is radically unintelligible, even if at the same time, no thing can be adequately grasped in a human concept.<sup>97</sup>

## II. The Solution of the Philosophical Problem

On the one hand, the human intellect is capable of abstract operations, that is, of operations which are not only distinct from the sensory powers, but are separated from them, and related only inasmuch as the phantasm is the condition under which knowledge can take place as long as the soul is in the body. But these are not the ordinary, let alone the sole, operations of the intellect.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>94</sup> Cf. "Ad tertium dicendum quod Plato, secundum quosdam, posuit materiam non creatam; et ideo non posuit ideam esse materiae, sed materiae concausam. Sed quia nos ponimus materiam creatam a Deo, non tamen sine forma, habet quidem materia ideam in Deo, non tamen aliam ab idea compositi. Nam materia secundum se neque esse habet, neque cognoscibilis est," *ST* I. 15. 2 ad 3 (Ottawa, 112b).

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, and the body of the article.

<sup>96</sup> Plato is explicitly referred to in *ST* I. 15. 3 ad 3 (above note 94); Aristotle in *ST* I. 14. 11 arg. 1.

<sup>97</sup> "No *thing*" is said deliberately. For sensible things are not *conceivable* by us because of their materiality, while spiritual things are known only by analogy. We are not speaking of "pure objects" such as the objects of mathematics, nor of the knowledge we have through judgments.

<sup>98</sup> These are the operations which are most apt to reveal to us the nature of the intellect in itself, and consequently of the soul. A thinker, like St. Thomas, who is concerned about the freedom of the will, the spirituality of

On the other hand, the human intellect is capable of operations in contact with the sensory powers,<sup>99</sup> namely, our ordinary perceptual judgments<sup>100</sup> about the sensible things that fill our daily lives. These perceptual judgments are composite operations, of intellect and imagination in the case of speculative judgments ("Socrates is a man"); of intellect, imagination, and the discursive estimative, in the case of practical judgments ("I am a child, these are my parents, and this is the honor I should pay to them now").

Thus is constituted a real intellectual knowledge of the singular. For a sensible thing is not a pure conceivable and definable essence, but a composite of matter and form. In the sensible

the soul, its origin and destiny, will naturally speak much about them. He may appear to neglect perceptual judgments—though in fact St. Thomas explicitly refers to them, as in *ST* I. 86. 1, precisely as an instance of our intellectual knowledge of the material singular.

<sup>99</sup>Of the Thomistic terms, indirect knowledge, contact, conjunction or union, reflection, application, I have chosen the first. (a) It is no longer likely to lead to a confusion with Averroism. (b) Conjunction, union, and indirect knowledge are very vague terms, and convey little information. Reflection and application have acquired English meanings which suit them for the scientific processes, and for the conscious transfer of general principles to particular cases of action, but not for the simple perceptual knowledge of the material singular.

The possibility of such a choice implies that the relevant terms designate the same reality, and differ in that they make use of different analogies. P. Wébert takes them to designate different realities: "Il y a la fait de la réflexion sur le concret, par un regard de l'intelligence qui va de la species au phantasme dont elle est tirée. Il y a la cause ontologique qui est la continuité des puissances dans le sujet psychique. Il y a la finalité psychologique qui permet les judgments a sujet concret, ce qu'on appelle, en certaines passages, 'l'application,'" *op. cit.*, p. 309. Here, Fr. Wébert is using only one of the five meanings of *reflexio* which he had previously discovered in his analysis; secondly, he speaks of "continuité" where St. Thomas rather spoke of *colligantia* (see the last two texts in note 73); he seems to be unaware of the notion of "dynamic unity in operation."

<sup>100</sup>Though St. Thomas sometimes gives examples of perceptual judgments, and occasionally treats of opinion, perhaps the point at which he most clearly brings out the operational unity of this kind of knowledge is in the discussions of the term *sensible per accidens*; cf. *In VI Sent.* d. 49, 2. 2; *In II De Anima*, lect. 13; *ST* I. 12. 3 ad 3.

thing, its individuality is a limitation of its essential perfection, through matter and quantity and therefore time.<sup>101</sup> In other words, a sensible thing is a being, possessing a (potentially intelligible) nature, existing here and now. Our human knowledge of this being is in turn composite. The intellectual part is specified by the formal object (being) and is apprehended according to the essence as received in the intelligible *species*. This known essence (nature) is limited, by composition with the operation of the sense power, to a particularized actuation of this essence here and now.

Moreover, the intellectual knowledge of the material singular is, in the first instance at least, a judgment. The simplest reason for saying this is that particulars, and only particulars, exist, and the act of existing is known, and in the first instance only known, in the judgment.

Over and above this perceptual knowledge of the singular, there is a kind of scientific knowledge of the singular. The scientist (or philosopher) may wish to check the connection between his developed knowledge and the things which he knows. He will then reflect that his elaborated proposition or definition requires a formal principle from which it flows, namely, the intelligible *species*; that the intelligible *species*, as an actual determination, must have been derived from a retained experience or phantasm, and the phantasm through sense experience

<sup>101</sup> This statement is related to a time-honored "disputed question"—is "individuation" a perfection? The answer obviously depends on what "individuation" means. If it means "that characteristic of a being which consists in its being only one of many possible actuations of its specific essence," then individuation is an imperfection, to be found only in material things, and rooted in matter. But if "individuation" means "that characteristic of a being which consists in the full determination and actuation of an essence," then it is a transcendental perfection, and is identical with the being in act. Hence, there is no difficulty in simultaneously holding that "individuation" has matter as its principle; that angels are individuals, and that personality is a perfection, namely, in creatures, the proper act of existing of a rational nature.

from a sensible singular. If each one of these steps checks out properly, the result is a (scientific) reflective knowledge of the singular.

This doctrine, drawn from the text of St. Thomas, expresses our own experience. On the one hand, we do clearly have an intellectual knowledge of material singulars. We judge, intellectually and responsibly, "This is a good car, a shoddy piece of goods; that man is sick"; or again, "I ought to vote this afternoon; to give this sum to the community chest." On the other hand, though we can define essences and establish laws, we can only describe individuals, and in the last resort, point them out in experience. We know them intellectually; we do not grasp their individuality. We know clearly *that* they are individuals, and even this and that individual. But material individuality remains a kind of transcended limit of understanding. It is known by intellect as a determination to the *here and now* of sense (or the there and then of imagination), and remains in a way external to intellect. It is touched, but not assimilated.

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