



# Some Comments about Common Contemporary Theistic Arguments

### God as the Cause of the Beginning of the Universe

- 1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
- 2. The Universe began to exist.
- :. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.



- ✓ Big Bang Theory
- ✓ Expanding Universe
- ✓ Second Law of Thermodynamics



### The Scientific Evidence for the Design in the Universe


### Extrinsic Design of the Universe as a Whole


- Design as fine tuning for life
- Design as the origin of life


### **Intrinsic Design of Living Systems**


- Design as information
- Design as irreducible complexity
- Design as knowledge of reality
















### & Weaknesses &

Without further arguments, they do not demonstrate that the cause of the universe is God (i.e., that the cause has the attributes of classical theism).







& My Weaknesses &

Certain aspects of the science are disputed.


Such disputes can invariably get technical and, thus, are beyond the knowledge of the non-scientist like me.







"But on the philosophical level these arguments are open to rebuttal and refutation, for they are not philosophically cogent."


[Joseph Owens, "Aquinas and the Five Ways," *Monist* 58 (Jan. 1974): 16-35. (p. 33)]



"It does not bother them if the philosophy thus bandied about under the name of science often consists in a denial of the validity of philosophical position as accepted by those whose metier [profession] is philosophy. ...









## Philosophical Background to the Classical Theistic Arguments


## There are two great philosophical traditions in Western thought that have endured since the ancient Greeks.




There are two great philosophical/theological traditions in Christian thought that have tracked these two Greek philosophical traditions.











Exploring the contours of how these traditions have answered certain basic questions about the nature of reality and our knowledge of it, will enable us to position many questions and concerns we have as Christians.
























































- Aquinas began writing his Summa Theologiae in 1266.
- Aquinas's Summa Theologiae is his most extensive work.
- It was, however, unfinished.
- It was written as a Teacher's Guide




It was written as an attempt to "set forth whatever is included in this Sacred Science as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may allow ... in such a way as may tend to the instruction of beginners."

[Summa Theologiae, from the Prologue. St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica: Complete English Edition in Five Volumes, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981]



### Works Antecedent to the Summa Theologiae

- On Being and Essence
- Writings on the Sentences of Peter Lombard
- Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius
- Exposition on the 'On the Hebdomads' of Boethius
- On the Principles of Nature
- Truth
- Summa Contra Gentiles
- On the Power of God





### 

### First Part

- Prima Pars; I; la
- 119 questions consisting of 584 articles
  - existence and nature of God
  - creation
  - **♦**man
  - divine government

### Some the Summa Theologiae <</p> ✓

First Part of the Second Part

Prima Secundae; I-II; Ia-lae

114 questions consisting of 619 articles

- morality
- ♦ the habits
- **♦**law

### 

Second Part of the Second Part

Secunda Secundae; II-II; lia-liae

189 questions consisting of 917 articles

- **♦**faith
- prudence and justice
- ❖fortitude and temperance
- \*acts of certain men (prophecy; tongues; contemplative life, etc.)

### Some the Summa Theologiae <</p> ✓

Third Part

Tertia Pars; III; IIIa

90 questions consisting of 549 articles

- **\***Christ
- sacraments (section on penance was unfinished)

### 

Supplement (written by Rainaldo da Piperno)

Suppl.; Suppl. Illae

99 questions consisting of 446 articles


- ❖completion of section on penance
- ❖ confession
- ❖indulgences
- ❖marriage
- eschatology

### 

Appendices 1 and 2 (complied by Nicolai from Aquinas's Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard)


purgatory


### Property Summa Su





"The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.


Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)











## AQUINAS AND THE FIVE WAYS

Do the well-known "five ways" in the Samma of Theology represent satisfactorily the attitude of Thomas Aquinas towards the demonstration of God's existence? There are reasons for doubt. In their mode of expression, the "five ways" are puzzling. They are of conflicting historical provenance. They do not make clear whether they are more than one or just one proof, whether they are entirely metaphysical in character, or whether they need to be prolonged or completed to reach the Christian God. Nowhere else in Aquinas is

metapiyakas in stansass, sa completed to reach the Christian God.\* Nowhere else in Aquinas is 
\$1, 1, 2, 3, c. The impression that the five way are the only ones 
toogoland by Aquinas, and that all other statistions have to be reduced 
to expect the control of the control of


nwin, 1933), pp. 21-39.


2. See discussion on "The Enigma of the Five Ways," in Edward A. 
Illem, Ways of Thinking about Gods Thomas Aguinas and Some Recent 
volkers (Londonic Datron, Longman & Todd, 1951), pp. 53-78. On the 
totion of one proof though expressed in five different ways, see Michel

Aquinas's argument demonstrates, not that there is a cause of the universe's beginning to exist, but that there is a cause of the universe's current existing.

Though Aquinas certainly believed that the world was created a finite time ago, his cosmological argument is indifferent as to whether the universe began to exist a finite time ago or has existed from all eternity.









Act and potency are sometimes referred to as actuality and potentiality.


This is how Aristotle and Aquinas account for change.





There are both logical and metaphysical senses of the terms "potency" or "possible."


## Logically, something may be possible (or potential) in as much as it is not a contradiction.














"Howsoever anything acts, it does so inasmuch as it is in act; howsoever anything receives, it does so inasmuch as it is in potency."


[Bernard J. Wuellner, Summary of Scholastic Principles (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1956), 5]





According to Aristotle, there are four principles or causes which are necessarily involved in the explanation of a sensible object.





















## Efficient Cause that by which an effect is = who produced the chair: the builder

































"As the production of a thing into existence depends on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should be preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than by ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing."




[Summa Theologiae 1, Q, 9, ii]










Because if that that thing was not existing by virtue of its essence, it would need to be continuously caused to exist by something else.

























































## Thomas Aquinas's "Five Ways" Argument from motion Argument from efficient causality Argument from necessary being Argument from degrees of perfection Argument from final causality Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)































































































Some voices in Contemporary
Empiricism attempted to confine
philosophy's scope by insisting
that it is only a second-order
discipline which should be
concerned only with aiding the
endeavors of the natural sciences.













"But, actually, the validity of the analytic method is not dependent on any empirical, much less any metaphysical, presupposition about the nature of things. For the philosopher, as an analyst, is not directly concerned with the physical properties of things. He is concerned only with the way in which we speak about them. In other words, the propositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character."


[Ayer, Language, p. 57]


















































"The undeniable character of the rolling indicates that it is at least dependent upon the chalk [or cue ball in my illustration] as something to be in and of.


## "Reflection upon experience definitely leads us to an acknowledgement of material' causality."


[John Knasas, Being and Some 20th Century Thomists (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 220]


"The rolling cannot be totally depend upon the chalk, since as having the motion in and of it, the chalk is in potency to the motion and so cannot completely explain it.


"A complete explanation demands something else, and this is the cause. The cause is responsible for the accident being in and of some thing."


[John Knasas, Being and Some 20th Century Thomists (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 220]















"The concept of cause accordingly is a pure concept of the understanding, which is totally disparate from all possible perception and only serves to determine the representation subsumed under it, with respect to judging in general, and so to make a universally valid judgment possible."


[Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, revision of the Mahaffy-Carus translation (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril, 1950), 48]





















"Thomas Aquinas's Proofs: The Uncaused Cause. Nothing is caused by itself. Every effect has a prior cause, and again we are pushed back into regress. This has to be terminated by a first cause, which we call God."





"All three of these arguments [by Aquinas] rely upon the idea of a regress and invoke God to terminate it. They make the entirely unwarranted assumption that God himself is immune to the regress."




















The Universe began to exist.

Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.

Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.

Note carefully the logic of the argument. Aquinas is not arguing:

"Since there cannot be a infinite regress, there must be a first cause."

Rather, he is arguing:

Since there must be first cause, there cannot be an infinite regress."

Not: If (since) there cannot be an infinite regress, there must be a first cause. There cannot be an infinite regress. Therefore, there is a first cause.

1. ~IR ⊃ F
 2. ~IR / ∴ F


Kalam Cosmological Argument Rather: If (since) there is a first cause, there cannot be an infinite regress. There is a first cause.
Therefore, there cannot be an infinite regress.


1. IR ⊃ ~F


2. F / ::~IR

Contingency (Thomistic)
Cosmological Argument


Dawkins is not alone in his mistaken assumption that Aquinas is arguing for the impossibility of an infinite regress in the Kalam sense.









"The question, however, is whether such an infinite series of motions (or causes) is conceivable. Thomas, of course, denied that it is. In reply, the series of positive integers—1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and so on—could be cited. It is clear that this series does not have a last term ...





"Similarly, it could be said that before any time t, however remote in the past, there was an earlier time t – 1, in which motion was occurring. If there is no greatest positive integer, why need there be any first motion?"


[W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy: The Medieval Mind (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, 1969): 219]

















"Aquinas believed that one could argue back from the things that we observe in the world to a prime mover, a first cause or a great designer behind it. In each case the drift of the argument follows the same basic pattern. Every event must have a cause. Nothing causes (or, for that matter, moves or designs) itself. If we press far enough back, we must acknowledge some first cause, prime mover or great designer of all things."


[Colin Brown, *Philosophy and the Christian Faith* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1968): 26-27, emphasis added]


























"Take again the arguments professing to prove the existence of God. All of these, except the one from teleology in lifeless things, depend upon the supposed impossibility of a series having no first term. Every mathematician know that there is no such impossibility; the series of negative integers ending with minus one is an instance to the contrary."

[Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972): 462]



It is my contention that all of these are misunderstanding Aquinas and that Aquinas is not making a Kalam type of argument.

To understand Aquinas's argument here, it is necessary to understand the distinction between two types of infinite series.



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### TWO NOTIONS OF THE INFINITE IN THOMAS AQUINAS' SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 1, QUESTIONS 2 AND 46


Richard G. Howe, Ph.D.

Near the beginning of his Summa Theologiae, the thirteenth century Dominican monk, Thomas Aquinas, claims that "the existence of God can be proved in five ways." These arguments are regularly referred to as his Five Ways and are for many perhaps the most familiar reading from Thomas. Of particular interest for my purposes are the first three of these Five Ways in which Thomas clearly denies the possibility of "going on to infinity." I have discovered that a number of


1. Deam esse quimque viiz probari potest. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1, 2, 3. All English translations are from Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas, translation by Falber of the English Dominisan Povince (Wastenistee, MD. Christian Catalation, 1981). Homas acknowledges that certain of these arguments are not completely original with him. They are bound for example, in Artistotle Physics (VII. J. 2142) and Machanist (VII. 7) (1972). Though the Five Hoys are Thomas' most famous arguments for God's evidence, certain ones of them are expounded with greater detail in other of his works, ne bulmp the St. 18. The Comment Contract Conflict. 1, 13.


2. procedere for procedumr/ in infimum

Richard G. Howe is Professor of Apologetics at Southern Evangelical Seminary in Charlotte. NC




























"The proof in no way considers movement as a present reality the existence of which requires an efficient cause in the past, which is God.

Etienne Gilson (1884-1978)











































# Is this a fallacy? Everything in the universe is caused, therefore the universe is caused.





# Everyone has a mother.

For every person, there is a woman who is the mother of that person.

 $\forall x \exists y (Px \supset (Wy \circ M(yx)))$ 

# There is a mother that everyone has.

There is a woman who is the mother of every person.

 $\exists y \ \forall x \ (Px \supset (Wy \circ M(yx)))$ 

### Every physical thing in the universe has a cause.


For every physical thing in the universe, there is an object that is the cause of that physical thing.


 $\forall x \exists y (Px \supset (Oy \circ C(yx)))$ 


# There is cause for every physical thing in the universe.


There is an object that is the cause of every physical thing in the universe.


 $\exists y \ \forall x \ (Px \supset (Oy \circ C(yx)))$ 













New Scholasticism 59 (1985): 449-470

### The Convertibility of Being and Good in St. Thomas Aquinas


by Jan A. Aertsen

In MANY moderal thinkers, e.g. Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, the statement can be found: "being and good are convertible" (ens et bonum convertuntur)." That is to say, "being" and "good" concern convertance. In the is to any, being and good are interchangeable terms in predication (converti enim est conversim praedicars). Wherever "being" is predicated of something, the predicate "good" is involved as well.

That must imply that "good" is here not a concept that

adds a real content or a new quality to "being", as a result of which "being" is restricted. For in that case there would be no question of convertibility. "Good" is an attribute which pertains to every being, it is a property of being as such, a "mode that is common, and consequent upon every being." 4
In other words, "good" is coextensive with "being", it is one of the so-called transcendentia 5 which, since Suarez, are usually referred to as "transcendentals".

¹ Alexander of Hales, Swmmø I, Inq. 1, Tract. 3, q. 3, membrum 1, c. 1, a. 1, "An idem sit bonum et ens"; Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, fundam. 5, "Ens et bonum convertuntur, sieut velt Dionyslus", d. 34, a. 2, q. 3, fundam. 4, 1Abert the Great, be Bono q. 1, a. 6; Sussme Theol. tract. 6, q. 28; Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent. 8, 1, 3; De Ver. XXI, 2; In De Hedomedébus, lect. 3; Summo Theol. I, 16, 3. ?Thomas Aquinas, De Ver. I, 2 obj. 2.
? Thomas Aquinas, De Ver. I, 2 obj. 2.
? De Pet. IX, 7 ad 5; Bosum quod est in genere qualitatis, non est bonum quod convertitur cum ente, quod mullam rera supra ens addit. \*De Ver. I, !: modus generaliter consequens onne ens.
? Comp. Albert the Great, Swmma Theolopiae tract. 6, q. 27, c. 3; Bonum dicit intentionem communem et est de transcendentibus omne genes sieut et ens.



449

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