

There is a difference between "the order of knowing" and "the order of being"

The map is first in the order of knowing.


SES is first in the order of being.

There is a difference between "the order of knowing" and "the order of being"

When it comes to the arguments for God's existence:

The creation is first in the order of knowing.

God is first in the order of being.



"We must seek to determine what presuppositions are necessary to any object of knowledge in order that it may be intelligible to us." Taken at face value, this would be like saying that we would have to know how our sensory faculties operate before the physical world could be "intelligible to us."


[In Defense of the Faith, Vol. II: A Survey of Christian Epistemology, p. 201]

"If we begin the course of spiral reasoning at any point in the finite universe, as we must because that is the approximate starting point of all reasoning, we can call the method of implication into the truth of God the transcendental method."


[In Defense of the Faith, Vol. II: A Survey of Christian Epistemology, p. 201]

What he goes on to say seemingly indicates that Van Til understands this.


However, the very nature of this "transcendental method" will end up overlooking this distinction and its implications for apologetics.









"Now RC is saying that he wants to start with epistemology and move to ontology, or metaphysics. Let's just start with the law of non-contradiction, the basic reliability of sense perception and the law of causality. And from those epistemological platforms, from that platform, move to the existence of God.






"And that's not an ontological statement because we would agree ontologically that there wouldn't be any logic or sense experience if God hadn't created the world and was a coherent God."


"I am making an epistemological point— that it doesn't even make sense to use mathematics or empiricism or natural science of any sort without already knowing that there is a God that is the context in which interpretation and predication is possible. That's the transcendental argument, saying that the precondition of intelligibility and knowledge is already the existence of God. And that does not purport to be a probable argument for God's existence but a certain argument, a necessary argument, an inescapable argument."




"It is certainly true that if God has any significance for any object of knowledge at all, the relation of God to that object of knowledge must be taken into consideration from the outset. It is this fact that the transcendental method seeks to recognize."


Christian Epistemology, p. 201]









"The only 'proof' of the Christian position is The difference is between presupposed there is no possibility of "the truth" 'proving' anything at all. (ontological) and "presupposing the truth" affairs as preached by Christianity is the (epistemological). necessary foundation of 'proof' itself." ["My Credo" in Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Philosophy and Apologetics of Comelius Van Til (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1971), 21]




"The charge is made that we engage in circular reasoning. Now if it be called circular reasoning when we hold it necessary to presuppose **Epistemological** the existence of God, we are not ashamed of it because we are firmly convinced that all forms of reasoning that leave **Ontological** God out of account will end in ruin." [In Defense of the Faith, Vol. II: A Survey of Christian Epistemology, p. 201]






"The existence of the God of Christian theism and the conception of his counsel as controlling all things in the universe is the only presupposition which can account for the uniformity of nature which the scientist needs. But the best and only possible proof for the existence of such a God is that his existence is required for the uniformity of nature and for the coherence of all things in the world."


[The Defense of the Faith (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1979), 103]





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
[The Defense of the Faith (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1979), 103]




















"It is not as though we already know some facts and laws to begin with, irrespective of the existence of God, in order then to reason from such a beginning to further conclusions.."

No apologetic system of which I am aware thinks there are facts and laws that are irrespective of the existence of God.

[In Defense of the Faith, Vol. II: A Survey of Christian Epistemology, p. 201]

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
[In Defense of the Faith, Vol. II: A Survey of Christian Epistemology, p. 201]


Given that the question of the existence of God is a metaphysical (ontological) one, Van Till's statement here is not Presuppositionalism. "It is not as though we already know some facts and laws to begin with, irrespective of the existence of God, in order then to reason from such a beginning to further conclusions.."

Christian Epistemology, p. 201]

To be a presuppositional argument, Van Till should have said:


"It is not as though we already know some facts and laws to begin with, irrespective of the presupposition of the existence of God, in order then to reason from such a beginning to further conclusions.."





"We must avoid the idea that human reason exists as a known and definable entity apart from God so that we may begin from it as from an ultimate starting point."

[In Defense of the Fath, Vol. V. An Introduction to Systematic Theology, p. 21]



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Systematic Theology, p. 21]


Because of this, Van Till is not making a presuppositional argument at all. Instead, his argument collapses into the classical cosmological argument.

"We must avoid the idea that human reason exists as a known and definable entity apart from God so that we may begin from it as from an ultimate starting point."

[In Defense of the Faith, Vol. V: An Introduction to Systematic Theology, p. 21]

To be a presuppositional argument, Van Till should have said:

"We must avoid the idea that human reason exists as a known and definable entity apart from the presupposition of God so that we may begin from it as from an ultimate starting point."



"The Reformed apologist assumes that nothing can be known by man about himself or the universe unless God exists and Christianity is true."


[The *Defense of the Faith*, (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1979), 223]


Again, this is an ontological point, not an epistemological one.


As with the previous examples, because this is an ontological point, Van Till is not making a Presuppositional argument at all, but, instead, is making a classical

cosmological argument.

"The Reformed "The Reformed apologist assumes apologist assumes that nothing can that nothing can be known by man be known by man about himself or To be a about himself or presuppositional the universe argument, Van the universe unless he Till should unless God exists presupposes that have said: and Christianity is God exis true." and Christianity is true." [The *Defense of the Faith*, (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1979), 223] [The *Defense of the Faith*, (Phillipsburgh: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1979), 223]









"But we really do not grant that you see any fact in any dimension of life truly. We really think you have colored glasses on your nose when you talk about chickens and cows, as well as when you talk about the life hereafter."

[Why | Believe in God (Philadelphia: Westminster Theological Seminary, n.d.), 9]






"A Reformed method of apologetics must seek to vindicate the Reformed life and world view as Christianity come to its own. ... This implies a refusal to grant that any area or aspect o reality, any fact or any law of nature or of history can be correctly interpreted except it be seen in the light of the main doctrines of Christianity."


[The Defense of the Faith (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1979), 96]

One must ask:


- (1) What is it to be "correctly interpreted?
- (2) Must this correct interpretation be a presupposition or can it be a conclusion?



"The question is no longer how I may obtain knowledge of some object with which I come in contact. Nor is it only the question of how I may impart that knowledge to my fellow man in general. The question is rather how I may impart the knowledge that I have to those who by virtue of their opposition have no true knowledge and ye think that they have." [In Defense of the Faith, Vol. II: A Survey of Christian Epistemology, p. 200]





"The heart of Van Til's argument centers around the word fact. The word has two specific meanings. It can be used to express an event in history or a phenomenon in science ... [or] to express the meaning of an event or phenomenon. For example, the historical event of the Exodus can be seen as a fact in both senses: 1) the Exodus from Egypt 2) ... the freeing of the Children of Israel from the oppression of Pharaoh by the hand of God. ...



"It is necessary, if we are going to speak clearly and unequivocally, to distinguish between the secular use of the word fact and the spiritual use of the same, that is between its use in a mere time-space secular sense and dimension and its use in a theological transcendent sense or dimension. Van Til has not done this."


[R. Allan Killen, Apologetics and Evangelism: A Study of Two Modem Apologetic Systems (Jackson: Reformed Theological Seminary, 1978), 481






The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament shows His handiwork.


Psalm 19:1







"... We also are men with the same nature as you, and preach to you that you should turn from these useless things to the living God, who made the heaven, the earth, the sea, and all things that are in them, who in bygone generations allowed all nations to walk in their own ways. Nevertheless He did not leave Himself without witness, in that He did good, gave us rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness." Act 14:15-17

General Revelation	Special Revelation
God making known to mankind through His creation His existence, attributes, and goodness which enable us to distinguish in Scripture proper vs. figurative language of God	God making known to mankind through His prophets, apostles, and His Son His nature and will that could not necessarily be known through General Revelation
⇔ Romans 1:20a ≪	
For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead, so that they are without excuse.	All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be complete, thoroughly equipped for every good work.
Book of Nature	Book of Scripture
Natural Theology	Biblical Theology
Systematic Theology	









The traditional approach
does not challenge the
autonomy of the natural
man's thinking, but
naively assumes that his
experience and
understanding of causal
relations is intelligible. If
everything has a cause, it
is argued, then he should
admit that this world also
has a cause—which can
only be God."


[Van Til's Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (Phillipsburg: P&R, 1998), 617, 618]




Traditional
formulations of the
cosmological proof
for God's existence
have always been, as
autonomously
conceived and
interpreted,
philosophically
embarrassing.




How should we understand the fundamental premise in the cosmological argument, 'Everything has a cause' (or 'Every object has an origin,' or, better 'Every even has a cause')?









"Everything had a cause, and every cause is the effect of a previous cause.
Something must have started it all. God ... is the eternal first cause ... the creator and sustainer of the universe.





"The major premise of this argument 'everything had a cause,' is contradicted by the conclusion that 'God did not have a cause.' You can't have it both ways. If everything had to have a cause, then there could not be a first cause."

[Dan Barker, Godless: How an Evangelical Preacher Became One of America's Leading Atheists (Berkeley: Ulysses Press, 2008), 113-114]

























"The old cosmological argument claimed that since everything has a cause, there must be a first cause, an 'unmoved first mover.'

Today no theistic philosophers defend that primitive line because if everything needs a cause, so does God."

[Dan Barker, Godless, 130]

