

Aristotle Camping Out with His Dog.


- ❖ *Do you recognize a distinction between the dog and the black/white color of the dog?*
- ❖ *It would seem that the dog is real in a different way than how the colors of the dog are real.*
- ❖ *While there can be a dog without the black/white color, there cannot be the black/white color without some thing that is colored.*
- ❖ *This distinction is what Aristotle called the substance/accident distinction.*
- ❖ *The term 'accident' here is similar to our contemporary terms 'property' or 'characteristic' or 'attribute'.*

- ❖ *Further, do you recognize a distinction between the dog and his lying down?*
- ❖ *It would seem that the dog is real in a different way than the "lying down" of the dog is real.*
- ❖ *While there can be a dog without the "lying down," there cannot be the "lying down" without some thing that is lying down.*
- ❖ *Notice also that not only is there a distinction between the dog and its color and the dog and its lying down, but there also is a distinction between the color and the lying down.*
- ❖ *Thus, these two accidents are not related to the dog in exactly the same way.*



- ❖ *The color and the lying down are two examples of Aristotle's Ten Categories.*
- ❖ *These categories are ten "modes" or "ways" of being in the sensible world.*
- ❖ *The Ten Categories are:*





Category	Meaning	Greek	Example
Substance	What	ousia	dog, tree
Quantity	How much	poson	small, tall
Quality	What sort	poion	Great Dane, oak
Relation	in relation to something	pros ti	smaller, taller
Place or Location	Where	pou	in my yard
Time	When	pote	right now, last year
Position	Being situated	keisthai	lying, standing
State or Habitus	Having, possession	echein	is leashed, is covered
Action	Doing	poiein	bites, shades
Passion	Undergoing	paschein	is fed, is pruned

A three-foot^{Quantity} husky^{Quality}
dog^{Substance}, much taller than^{Relation} her
puppy, was lying^{Position} in my yard^{Place}
yesterday^{Time} on a leash^{State (Habitus)},
biting her paw^{Action}, completely
unaware that she was being
fed^{Passion} by me.





A group of about ten dogs of various breeds and sizes are posed together against a plain white background. The dogs include a Boston Terrier, a Golden Retriever, a German Shepherd, a Labrador Retriever, a Pit Bull, a Beagle, and several smaller breeds like Chihuahuas and a dachshund.	<p>From individual dogs, one can derive the concept of dog.</p>
This is a smaller version of the same photograph shown at the top of the slide, depicting a winding road through a forest with vibrant autumn foliage.	<p>From individual trees, one can derive the concept of tree.</p>



From individual dogs, one can derive the concept of dog.

From individual trees, one can derive the concept of tree.

- ❖ *The relationship of the concept of 'dog' or 'tree' to the individual dogs or trees is the relationship of universal to particulars*
- ❖ *One debate that has endured throughout the history of philosophy has been over what exactly is the nature of the universal.*



From individual dogs, one can derive the concept of dog.

From individual trees, one can derive the concept of tree.

- ❖ *Are universals merely names we give to things (Nominalism / Hume)?*
- ❖ *Or are universals more than names but nothing more than concepts (Conceptualism / Ockham)?*
- ❖ *Or are universals "real" in some sense of the term 'real'? (Realism)*



❖ *If universals are real in some sense of the term 'real', exactly what is the nature of their reality?*

- *Are universals the fully real whereas the individuals "participate in" or "imitate" the universals? (Extreme Realism / Platonism)*
- *Do universals "exist" as particulars in the individual and are only universal in the intellect? (Moderate Realism / Aristotelianism)*
- *Are universals "ideas" in God's mind as their Creator and are made real as particulars in creation? (Scholastic Realism / Thomism)*



❖ *Notice also that the universal is free of any specifying characteristics of the individual.*

❖ *The concept 'dog' does not specify German Shepherd or Chihuahua; young or old; brown or black; sitting or lying; eating or being washed ...*

❖ *The concept 'tree' is free of such individuating characteristics such as tall or short; deciduous or evergreen; fruit-bearing, flower-bearing or neither; in my backyard or in my neighbor's backyard ...*





❖ Notice that, despite the changes in all the characteristics (accidents), you can know that it is the same dog throughout.



❖ Likewise with the tree. From acorn to flourishing oak, despite all the changes, you can know that it is the same tree throughout.



❖ That aspect of the thing that constitutes its "sameness" is its *Form*.

❖ That aspect of the thing that constitutes its "changing" is its *Matter*.



❖ 'Form' and 'Matter' are metaphysical aspects of any sensible thing.

❖ Neither exists apart from the sensible thing itself.



- ❖ *The Form and Matter constitution of a sensible thing is known as hylomorphic dualism.*
- ❖ *This term comes from the Greek hule (ὕλη) which means 'matter' and morphe (μορφή) which means 'form'.*
- ❖ *They are metaphysical aspects of a single thing.*



- ❖ *Hylomorphic Dualism is to be distinguished from Substance Dualism.*
- ❖ *Substance Dualism was championed by René Descartes (1596-1650).*
- ❖ *Descartes regarded the material and immaterial components of a human to be two separate substances.*




❖ *Note that the Great Dane puppy will inevitably grow into an adult Great Dane and the acorn will inevitably grow into a mature Oak tree unless something interferes (like injury, malnourishment, or disease).*



- ❖ *The trajectories of each is its teleology.*
- ❖ *The term comes for the Greek word 'telos' (τέλος), meaning 'end' or 'goal'.*
- ❖ *A thing's teleology is determined by its nature.*
- ❖ *A thing's nature is that which constitutes "what" it is.*
- ❖ *An acorn will never become a Great Dane.*



- ❖ *These accidents of the thing that are not yet realized eventually will be realized if nothing interferes.*
- ❖ *These accidents that are yet to become real are known as potencies (or potentialities or capacities) that "exist" in the thing.*



- ❖ *Once they become real, they are actual (or actualities).*
- ❖ *Aristotle identifies this as the act/potency distinction.*



- ❖ Aristotle called that which brings a potentiality into actuality the *Efficient Cause*.
- ❖ Aristotle identified three additional causes.



- ❖ The *Efficient Cause* is that **by which** a thing is.
- ❖ The *Material Cause* is that **out of which** a thing is.
- ❖ The *Formal Cause* is that **which** a thing is.
- ❖ The *Final Cause* is that **for which** a thing is.



*Last, notice that you can think of a dog
or tree or any number of sensible
objects that used to exist but no longer
exist today.*

*The concept of a dog or a tree (i.e.,
"what" it is/was) does not change.*

*The only thing that has changed is
"that" it was and now no longer "is."*

*This is the essence / existence
distinction.*

The essence is what something is.

The existence is that something is.

*This is a philosophical augmentation of
Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas.*

*The essence is **what** something is.*

*The existence is **that** something is.*

*The essence / existence
distinction is a philosophical
augmentation of Aristotle's
metaphysics by Thomas Aquinas.*

 <p>Aristotle (384-322 BC)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ <i>substance/accident</i> ✓ <i>ten categories</i> ✓ <i>universal/particular</i> ✓ <i>form/matter</i> ✓ <i>teleology</i> ✓ <i>act/potency</i> ✓ <i>four causes</i> ✓ <i>essence/existence</i> 	 <p>Aquinas (1225-1274)</p>
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