






To bridge the conversation from our last time together to the topic for tonight, I should like to make a few remaining comments on the problem of evil.










































For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead ...


Rom. 1:20a


The Classical tradition as exemplified in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas maintains can God's attributes can be rationally demonstrated.

One can find the most direct demonstration in Thomas Aquinas's Summa
Theologiae, I, QQ 3-25.


Included among those attributes are God's infinite goodness an omnipotence.

The metaphysics seeks to show that God is all good and all powerful even when we cannot demonstrate the connection between specific evils in the world and the specific goods that God might produce from them.







"As Augustine says 'Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil in his works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil.'
This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good."





[ST, I, Q2, art. 3, ad. 1]






To be sure, whether God is the highest good is precisely what needs to be demonstrated.






Natural Law Theory is a philosophical and theological view of the good and human morality based on the nature of humans and the nature of God.




Natural Law Theory is a philosophical and theological view of the good and human morality based on the nature of humans and the nature of God.



Given that certain aspects of human morality are philosophical issues, Natural Law Theory maintains that such aspects of the good and moral good can be known by human reason apart from Scripture.

This is not to say that every aspect of such things is accessible by human reason.
This is especially the case with man's eternal destiny.

"It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God, besides philosophical science built up by human reason ... because man is directed to God as to an end that surpasses the grasp of reason. ...




Thomas Aquinas


(1225-1274)


"But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation."

[Summa Theologiae I, 1]

While I agree with Aquinas's metaphysics regarding the philosophical aspects of human morality and goodness in achieving our end in this life, as a Protestant Evangelical, I do not agree with him regarding how we gain that ultimate end in the next life.















Analytic philosophy and Classical philosophy are two (among several) ways of understanding the nature, content, and procedures of philosophy.

The most obvious difference is that Classical philosophy does philosophy largely along the contours and categories of Ancient Greek and Medieval Philosophy.

Because of this, the moral argument for God's existence will differ between those apologists who employ Classical philosophy and those apologists who do not.


- 1. If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
- 2. Objective moral values do exist.
- 3. Therefore, God exists.





As a model of morality that follows
the contours and categories of
Ancient Greek and Medieval
Philosophy, Natural Law Theory
traffics in certain fundamental
concepts, most of which themselves
need to be unpacked, including:


law nature / natural human nature
nature vs. function substance vs. accident
act / potency teleology existence
God as Being and Goodness itself
good and evil good and moral good
obligation the Transcendentals
convertibility of 'being' and 'good'




























"While evangelicals today (both inside and outside of confessional traditions) may be surprised—even dismayed—by [Peter Martyr Vermigli's] strong affirmation of divine witness through the natural order,





"the older magisterial Protestant tradition (Lutheran and Reformed) not only inherited but also passed on the doctrines of lex naturalis and cognitio Dei naturalis, especially the idea of an implanted knowledge of morality, as noncontroversial legacies of patristic and scholastic thought."


[Rediscovering the Natural Law in Reformed Theological Ethics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 1]




















































"It is evident, granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providence ... that the whole community of the universe is governed by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the government of things in God the Ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law.


Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)























"It is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends.



"Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others.




"Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law."






[Summa Theologiae, I-II Q91, Art. 2)




"If we reflect that the Spirit of God is the only fountain of truth, we will be careful, as we would avoid offering insult to him, not to reject or contemn truth wherever it appears. In despising the gifts, we insult the Giver."

[Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge, (Grand Rapids: William B. Erdmans), Bk. II, Chap. 2, §15, p. 236]




"Nothing, indeed, is more common, than for man to be sufficiently instructed in a right course of conduct by natural law, of which the Apostle here speaks [in Rom. 2:14-15]."


[Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2 vols. trans. Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1975), Bk. II, Chap. 2, §22, p. 241]




"Since man is by nature a social animal, he is disposed, from natural instinct, to cherish and preserve society; and accordingly we see that the minds of all men have impressions of civil order and honesty.




"Hence it is that every individual understands how human societies must be regulated by laws, and also is able to comprehend the principles of those laws.





"Hence the universal agreement in regard to such subjects, both among nations and individuals, the seeds of them being implanted in the breasts of all without a teacher or lawgiver. ... It is true, that some principle of civil order is impressed on all.






[Institutes, Bk. II, §13, pp. 234-235]








"Natural law is taken strictly and properly for the practical rule of moral duties to which men are bound by nature. ... The orthodox ... affirm that there is a natural law ... arising ... from a divine obligation being impressed by God upon the conscience of man in his very creation ... drawn from the right of nature itself, found both on the nature of God, the Creator ... and on the condition of rational creatures themselves

"Natural law is taken strictly and properly for the practical rule of moral duties to which men are bound by nature. ... The orthodox ... affirm that there is a natural law ... arising ... from a divine obligation being impressed by God upon the conscience of man in his very creation ... drawn from the right of nature itself, found both on the nature of God, the Creator ... and on the condition of rational creatures themselves









"Indeed insofar as ideas of natural law were intimately woven into the fabric of the European ius commune of which Calvin the law student would have imbibed in his youth, he had no reason to consider his reference to natural law as anything out of the ordinary."


[David VanDrunen,"Medieval Natural Law and the Reformation: A Comparison of Aquinas and Calvin," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 80 (2006): 77-98]



> John T. McNeill (1885-1975) →


"There is no real discontinuity between the teaching of the Reformers and that of their predecessors with respect to natural law. Not one of the leaders of the Reformation assails the principle. Instead, with the possible exception of Zwingli, they all on occasion express a quite ungrudging respect for the moral law naturally implanted in the human heart and seek to inculcate this attribute in their readers."

[John T. McNeill, "Natural Law in the Teaching of the Reformers," in *The Journal of Religion* 26, no. 3 (July 1946): 168-182. The citation is from p. 1681








"Just as, in the speculative reason, from indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason,





"so too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determinations of certain matters.


















"It was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law. ... If man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural faculty, there would be no need for man to have any further direction on the part of his reason, besides the natural law and human law


Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)































The 'natural' in Natural Law refers to the fact that human beings are what we are because we possess a human nature.











Act and potency are sometimes referred to as actuality and potentiality.


This is how Aristotle and Aquinas account for change.


= the power or capacity or possibility to be actual or real


Logical Potency
VS.
Metaphysical Potency


There are both logical and metaphysical senses of the terms "potency" or "possible."

Logically, something may be possible (or potential) in as much as it is not a contradiction.











Active potency is the ability of something to cause change in something else.

Passive potency is the ability of something to undergo change in as much as it possess metaphysical potency.











A person who is actually sitting but not actually standing, nevertheless has the potential or power or capacity to stand.








Upon standing, the person actualizes his potential to stand, his standing becomes actual and his sitting now becomes potential.


































"Nor is it true that for Aquinas 'good and evil are concepts analysed and fixed in metaphysics before they are applied in morals'.32 On the contrary, Aquinas asserts as plainly as possible that the first principals of natural law, which specify the basic forms of good and evil and which can be adequately grasped by anyone of the age of reason (and not just by metaphysicians), are per se nota (self evident) and indemonstrable.33

32D. J. O'Connor, Aquinas and Natural Law (London: 1967), p.

68. SAquinas, *in Eth*, V, lect. 12, para. 1018; S.T, I-II, p. 94, a. 2; q. 91, a. 3c; q. 58, aa. 4:c, 5c.




They are not inferred from speculative principles. They are not inferred from facts. They are not inferred from metaphysical propositions about human nature, or about the nature of good and evil, or about 'the function of a human being '34 nor are they inferred from a teleological conception of nature or any other conception of nature. They are not inferred or derived from anything."

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35Face Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 1-6.

[John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, 33-34]





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⁵²D. J. O'Connor, Aquinas and Natural Law (London: 1967), p. 68.
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"Nor is it true t

they are applied in morals.

This is a confusion of the epistemology of morals with the metaphysics of morals.

But we are not claiming that

good and evil have to be

analyzed and fixed BEFORE

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Just because we can know X before we know anything about the metaphysics of X does not mean that there is no metaphysics of X.

Nor does it mean that the metaphysics of X should never come into the discussion when the reality of X is in dispute.

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
A person may know that God exists even if he never considers the metaphysical aspects of God.


But it can become critical to introduce the metaphysical issues in a dispute about the existence of God.

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
32D. J. O'Connor, Aquinas and Natural Law (London: 1967), p

68. ³³Aquinas, *in Eth*, V, lect. 12, para. 1018; S.*T*. I-II, p. 94, a. 2; q





"Hence, this is the first precept of law, that: bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum."



"Hence, this is the first precept of law, that: good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided."

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)

Finnis is missing Aquinas's point. Aquinas maintains that it is the **DOING** of good and evil not the **BEING** of good and evil that is self-evident and indemonstrable.

Second, Aquinas maintains that there is a difference between something being self-evident in itself though not to us and self-evident in itself and to us.

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⁵⁵Aquinas, *in Eth*, V, lect. 12, para. 1018; *S.T.* I-II, q. 94, a. 2; q 91, a. 3c; q. 58, aa. 4.c, 5c.

"A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways; on the one hand, self evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us."

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)

For example, the equation 2 + 2 = 4, though self-evident in itself (in as much as the predicate '4' is contained in the subject '2 + 2'), will not be self-evident to a child learning arithmetic who has yet to learn what the equal sign means.

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Thus, for Aquinas it is a first principle of law that the good is to be done and evil avoided.

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This, however, says nothing against the case for and the relevance of the metaphysics of what it is that makes something good or evil.

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Third, there is a difference between whether they are inferred from speculative principles **BEFORE** they are employed in action, and whether they can, in fact, be inferred from speculative principles.

They are not inferred from speculative principles. They are not inferred from facts. They are not inferred from metaphysical propositions about human nature, or about the nature of good and evil, or about 'the function of a human being 134 nor are they inferred from a teleological conception of nature or any other conception of nature. They are not inferred or derived from anything."

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For example, one does not have to infer from speculative principles that God exists before one is able to believe that God exists.


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"There is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically [i.e. rationally] known and demonstrated."

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)



This, however, is not to say that the existence of God cannot be so inferred from speculative (i.e., metaphysical) principles. This is exactly what Aquinas does deftly.

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Thus, it would seem that Finnis's view is not aligned with Aquinas's.

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
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
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
"Whenever things have such a definite nature ... the operation appropriate to a given being is a consequent of that nature.


Now, it is obvious that there is a determinate kind of nature for man. Therefore, there must be some operations that are in themselves appropriate for man."

[SCG III, 129, §4, trans. Vernon J. Bourke (University of Notre Dame Press Edition) vol. 3:II, p. 163. Reprint of *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith* (Garden City, NY: Hanover House, 1956)]





























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This nature for the human is not merely a reference to the human body.

Rather the nature involves that nature with respect to the operations.


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
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This nature for the human is not merely a reference to the human body.


Rather the nature involves that nature with respect to the operations.


Unlike plants or other animals, humans possess rationality and free will which allow us to choose either in accordance with or in opposition to our proper end.






When we chose in accordance with our proper end, we actualize our good or perfection, i.e., we cause them to come into existence and be made real.








A human being's end, goal, or telos can be understood in terms of different aspects of his single reality, viz., his nutritive, (i.e., physical)

A human being's end, goal, or telos can be understood in terms of different aspects of his single reality, viz., his nutritive, (i.e., physical), his sentient (i.e., consciousness)

A human being's end, goal, or telos can be understood in terms of different aspects of his single reality, viz., his nutritive, (i.e., physical), his sentient (i.e., consciousness), and his rational (intellect).























"Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has been rightly declared to be that at which all things aim."

[Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, 1, 1094a1-2, trans. W. D. Ross in Richard McKeon, ed. The Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941), 935]






"Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance.


Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law.

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)


"Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law.



"Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, which nature has taught to all animals, such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth.



"Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination."



[ST I-II, 94, art 2]

Our good involves our nature in three respects.

As such these fall under the Natural Law.

with respect to what we are in common with every substance

every substance seeks the preservation of its own being

every substance seeks the preservation of its own being
✓ preservation of human life

with respect to what we are in common with every substance

every substance seeks the preservation of its own being

- ✓ preservation of human life
- \checkmark warding off obstacles

every substance seeks the preservation of its own being

- ✓ preservation of human life
- √ warding off obstacles

with respect to what we are in common with every animal

with respect to what we are in common with every substance

every substance seeks the preservation of its own being

- ✓ preservation of human life
- √ warding off obstacles

with respect to what we are in common with every animal

every animal seeks to procreate and educate offspring

- every substance seeks the preservation of its own being
- √ preservation of human life
- √ warding off obstacles

with respect to what we are in common with every animal

every animal seeks to procreate and educate offspring

✓ marriage

with respect to what we are in common with every substance

every substance seeks the preservation of its own being

- ✓ preservation of human life
- ✓ warding off obstacles

with respect to what we are in common with every animal

every animal seeks to procreate and educate offspring

- ✓ marriage
- ✓ rearing and education of children

- every substance seeks the preservation of its own being
- √ preservation of human life
- √ warding off obstacles

with respect to what we are in common with every animal

every animal seeks to procreate and educate offspring

- √ marriage
- √ rearing and education of children

with respect to what we are proper to ourselves as human

with respect to what we are in common with every substance

every substance seeks the preservation of its own being

- ✓ preservation of human life
- ✓ warding off obstacles

with respect to what we are in common with every animal

every animal seeks to procreate and educate offspring

- ✓ marriage
- √ rearing and education of children

with respect to what we are proper to ourselves as human

humans have reason and free will

every substance seeks the preservation of its own being

- √ preservation of human life
- ✓ warding off obstacles

with respect to what we are in common with every animal

every animal seeks to procreate and educate offspring

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with respect to what we are proper to ourselves as human

humans have reason and free will

√ to know truth and shun ignorance

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humans have reason and free will

- ✓ to know truth and shun ignorance
- ✓ live in society and avoid offending others


As the intellect aims toward that which is considered true, the will aims toward that which is considered good.


As something may be considered true that is not really true, something may be considered good that is not really good.


True is that which corresponds to reality.


Good is that which actualizes a thing's telos, which is to say good is that which perfects the thing.

The good toward which our will aims may be our real good (when we act morally) or something mistakenly perceived as a good but which substitutes for our real good (when we act immorally).




















A human being is a good human being when he acts well, since it is a perfection of a human to have a virtuous character in accordance with the kind of thing he is by virtue of his human nature or essence.













Natural Law Theory, as a model of human morality, will define human goodness:


Natural Law Theory, as a model of human morality, will define human goodness: Initially (proximately) in terms of what perfects human nature,


Natural Law Theory, as a model of human morality, will define human goodness:


- > initially (proximately) in terms of what perfects human nature, and
- ultimately in terms of God as infinite being and goodness.





























These enable us to choose, not merely among particular goods, but to pursue the good as such.


But these will also allow us to choose against our own natures and against our proper telos (end) which is our good.




"Moral fault is found primarily and principally in the act of the will only . . . so . . . an act is moral because it is voluntary. . . . Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)













'Good' is first identified with 'desirable' (appetible).
 'Desirable' is identified with 'perfect'.




- 1. 'Good' is first identified with 'desirable' (appetible).
- 2. 'Desirable' is identified with 'perfect'.
- 3. 'Perfect' is identified with 'act' or 'actuality'.







"These perfected the material element in the sense of filling its potentiality and completing the thing.



perfection

(entelecheia, ἐντελέχεια)

en,
$$\dot{\epsilon}v = in$$

+

telos, τέλος = end, goal

+

echein, ἔχειν = to have

perfection

(entelecheia, ἐντελέχεια)

to have the end or goal in

A being whose essence is its existence will have, indeed, will BE, all the perfections of existence without limit.

- 1. 'Good' is first identified with 'desirable' (appetible).
- 2. 'Desirable' is identified with 'perfect'.
- 3. 'Perfect' is identified with 'act' or 'actuality'.
- 4. 'Actuality' is identified with 'being'.

A full exploration of how it is that 'being' and 'good' are convertible, which is to say that 'being' and 'good' are really the same, requires a examination of the Medieval doctrine of the Transcendentals.

New Scholasticism 59 (1985): 449-470

The Convertibility of Being and Good in St. Thomas Aquinas

by Jan A. Aertsen


In MANY medieval thinkers, e.g. Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, the statement can be found: "being and good are convertible" (ens et bonum convertuntur). That is to say, "being" and "good" are interchangeable terms in predication (converti enim est conversim praedicari).* Wherever "being" is predicated of something, the predicate "good" is involved as well.


That must imply that "good" is here not a concept that


adds a real content or a new quality to "being", as a result of which "being" is restricted. For in that case there would be no question of convertibility. "Good" is an attribute which pertains to every being, it is a property of being as such, a "mode that is common, and consequent upon every being" 4 In other words, "good" is coextensive with "being", it is one of the so-called transcendentia 5 which, since Suarez, are usually referred to as "transcendentals".

1 Alexander of Hales, Summa I, Inq. 1, Tract. 3, q. 3, membrum 1, e., a. 1, "An idem sit bonus et rea"; Bonaventure, Is II Sest, d. 1, 1, a. 1, q. 1, fundam. 5, "Ens et bonus envertundrs; sient velt longvius", d. 34, a. 2, q. 3, fundam. 4; Albert the Graat, De Bone q. a. 6; Summa Theel. tract. 6, q. 29; Themas Aguinas, In I Sest. 8, 1, De Yer, XXI, 2; In De Hoddomeditus, lect. 3; Summa Theel. I, 16, 3. "Thomas Aguinas, De Yer, I, 2 obj. 2.


"De Pet. IX, 7 ad 5; Bonum quod est in genere qualitatis, non est onum quod convertiture can send, quod vullam cras supra en addit. *bP Fer. I, 1; modus generaliter consequens omne ens. *comp. Albert the Graat, Summa Theelogier tract. 6, q. 27, c. 3; conum dielt intentionem communem et est de transcendentibus omne mas slett et en.











- 1. 'Good' is first identified with 'desirable' (appetible).
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- 3. 'Perfect' is identified with 'act' or 'actuality'.
- 4. 'Actuality' is identified with 'being'.
- 5. God is goodness itself in as much as God is being itself.


















































"The first indemonstrable principle is that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time ... [this] falls under the apprehension simply. Good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed at action." [ST I-II, Q94, art. 2]






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[*ST I-II*, Q94, art. 2]



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
- √ to know truth and shun ignorance
- ✓ live in society and avoid offending others



Our Moral Obligations To Our Fellow Man


Natural Law Morality focuses primarily on our relationship to our fellow man as God manages our peaceful coexistence in society.

Natural Law Theory is more politically compatible with Conservatism than it is with either Contemporary Liberalism or Libertarianism.



Further, our moral obligation to our fellow man arises out of our recognition that human beings, unique among God's creatures on Earth, are willers, not merely of particular goods, but of the good as such.

As such we recognize both ourselves and other humans as special instances of the good itself.





"To see man as the willer of the ratio boni is to engender a special status among things. ... No other thing in our experience so directly and intimately relates to the ratio boni. Only man has good as the proper object of his appetitive power ... and to understand this fact is for one to realize that one should treat oneself and others in a special way."


[Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists (New York Fordham University Press, 2003), 253.





"Though all beings
express the ratio boni,
only the human expresses
it in a sufficiently
heightened way that
confronts the freedom of
the will with an obligation,
a moral necessity. To see
the good is to ignite
volition; to see the good
as in the human willer of it
is to ignite obligation."


[Being and Some Twentleth-Century Thomists, 262.


























Not only is it not natural to us to achieve God's eternal purpose for us (Gen. 2:21; 15:12), but because we are morally fallen (corrupt) a fortiori we are unable in ourselves to achieve God's ultimate, eternal purpose for us.























































JOHN F. X. KNASAS



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The Convertibility of Being and Good in St. Thomas Aquinas

by Jan A. Aertsen

TN MANY medieval thinkers, e.g. Alexander of Hales, Bouaventure, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, the statement can be found: "being and good are convertible" (ens et bonum convertundur). That is to say, "being" and "good are interchangeable terms in predication (convertie esim est conversim praedicars). Wherever "being" is predicated of something, the predicate "good" is involved as well. That must imply that "good" is here not a concept that adds a real content or a new quality to "being", as a result of which "being" is restricted. For in that case there would be no question of convertibility. "Good" is an attribute which pertains to every being, it is a property of being as such, a "mode that is common, and consequent upon every being," it is one of the so-called transcendentia which, since Suarez, are usually referred to as "transcendentia".

1 Alexander of Hales, Swemen I, Inq. 1, Tract. 2, q. 3, membrum 1, e. 1, a. 1, "An idem at bourn et em"; Boaventare, In II Sent., d. 1, n. 1, "An idem at bourn et em"; Boaventare, In II Sent., d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, fundam. 5, "Ens at bourne convertuatrs, riest veit Dioxysius", d. 34, s. 2, q. 3, fundam. 4; Albert the Graat, De Bowe, 1, a. 6; Summe Flect. 1, d. 29; Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent. 8, 1, 3; De Ver, XXI, 2; In De Hebfonendikus, lect. 3; Summe Theol. I, 16, 3. 27 Demas Aquinas, De Ver. 1, 7 ob. 2. 12 Demas Aquinas, De Ver. 1, 7 ob. 2. 12 Demas Aquinas, De Ver. 1, 7 ob. 2. 12 Demas Aquinas, De Ver. 1, 7 ob. 2. 12 Demas Aquinas, De Ver. 1, 7 ob. 2. 12 Demas Aquinas, De Ver. 1, 7 ob. 2. 12 Demas Aquinas, De Ver. 1, 7 ob. 2. 12 Demas Aquinas, Dev. 1, 7 ob. 2, 7 ob. 2. 12 Demas Aquinas, Dev. 1, 7 ob. 2, 7

Jan Aertsen 1938-2016

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