

"Don't just teach your children to read ... teach them to question what they read. Teach them to question everything.

George Carlin


In effect, do you think George Carlin would want us to teach our children to question his claim that they should question everything? "Don't just teach your children to read ... teach them to question what they read. Teach them to question everything."


Further, do you think there are some things, the very questioning of which is already to abrogate human knowing?

"Don't just teach your children to read ... teach them to question what they read. Teach them to question everything."

George Carlin

For example, if we question whether humans can objectively know reality, how could we hope to discover the objectively real answer to the question?





Question Everything: How to Effectively Question Everything You 🗅

Think You Know Paperback - September 20, 2023

by Mark Fennell (Author)

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
The purpose of this book is to Guide you in the processes of Questioning your beliefs, and Eliminating Your Fears. During this process, you will become more joyful, and obtain everything you desire.


We encourage you to Question your life. Question your beliefs. Question what you have been told, about yourself and your world. Question everything...all of it.


For example, ask questions such as: Am I truly happy? Are my Beliefs getting my desires? How can I have better relationships?


Which experts do I trust? Who has my best interest?

How do I eliminate my fears? How can I create the life I want? Is it really possible to have a better world?





















"Everything had a cause, and every cause is the effect of a previous cause. Something must have started it all. God ... is the eternal first cause ... the creator and sustainer of the universe.

Dan Barker

"The major premise of this argument 'everything had a cause,' is contradicted by the conclusion that 'God did not have a cause.' You can't have it both ways. If everything had to have a cause, then there could not be a first cause."


[Dan Barker, Godless: How an Evangelical Preacher Became One of America's Leading Atheists (Berkeley: Ulysses Press, 2008), 113-114]




"The old cosmological argument claimed that since everything has a cause, there must be a first cause, an 'unmoved first mover.'


Today no theistic philosophers defend that primitive line because if everything needs a cause, so does God."

[Dan Barker, Godless, 130]







"I want to quickly go over some of the eleven major proofs. They have been 900 years in the formulation, and during this 900 years, this is what people have basically come up with. ... Everything must have a cause, therefore the universe must have a cause, and that cause was God. God was the first or uncaused cause. ... This leads to a real logical bind for the theist, because, then God must have a cause, then God must have a cause.





"If God had a cause, he cannot be the first or uncaused cause. If God did not have a cause, then not everything must have a cause. If not everything needs a cause, then perhaps the universe doesn't need a cause. Thus, there is a logical bind and the proof fails."


[The Great Debate: Does God Exist? Greg L. Bahnsen and Gordon Stein, University of California, Irvine, 1985]
















"Everything that exists has a cause; space and time exist; space and time must, therefore, have been caused by something that stands outside of space and time, and the only thing that transcends space and time, and yet retains the power to create, is God."


[Sam Harris, Letter to a Christian Nation (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), 72]

















First, even if Aquinas argued that "every event must have a cause,"

God is not an event.

Second, notice in his misconstruing of Aquinas's argument, he illicitly shifts from "every event" to "everything." Even if one argued that every event must have a cause, this is not equivalent to saying that everything has a cause.

"The second objection to the cosmological argument is that its conclusion is contradicted by its premise.

To illustrate, Aquinas insists that every event must have a cause. But if this is so, why stop with God? The notion of an uncaused cause seems to contradict the assumption that everything has a cause."


[Manuel Velasquez, *Philosophy: A Text with Readings* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2002), 288]


Third, in any event, Aquinas is not merely arguing that every event must have a cause. Rather, he is arguing that every "thing" in the sensible world has a cause.

What is more, Aquinas is not arguing that every thing in the sensible world has a cause of its "coming into being." Rather he is arguing that every thing in the sensible world has a current cause of its "existing."

"The second objection to the cosmological argument is that its conclusion is contradicted by its premise. To illustrate, Aquinas insists that every event must have a cause. But if this is so, why stop with God? The notion of an uncaused cause seems to contradict the assumption that everything has a cause."

[Manuel Velasquez, *Philosophy: A Text with Readings* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2002), 288]







"Although no one has defended a cosmological argument of precisely this form, it provides a useful stepping-stone to the other, more sophisticated versions."


[Robin Le Poidevin, Arguing for Atheism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (London: Routledge, 1996), 4]

















"No respectable theologian or theistic philosopher has ever made the claim, 'everything has a cause.' Yet various new atheists have proceeded to attack that straw man of their own making.




"I remember, when reading
The God Delusion by
Richard Dawkins, where he
attacked that straw man
and cringing. There are
many different cosmological
arguments for God's
existence and none of them
rely upon the stupid claim,
'everything has a cause.""


[http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2014/02/17/feser-insults-readers-of-www-infidels-org/#comment-1248907824, accessed 02/06/21. This article evidently has been removed from Patheos.]











"Perhaps the simplest and easiest to understand is the argument of the First Cause. (It is maintained that everything we see in this world has a cause, and as you go back in the chain of causes further and further you must come to a First Cause, and to that First Cause you give the name of God.) ...


















"What was it, then, which determined Something to exist rather than Nothing, and bestowed being on a particular possibility, exclusive of the rest?


David Hume (1711-1776)


"External causes, there are supposed to be none. Chance is a word without a meaning. Was it Nothing? But that can never produce any thing.




"We must,
therefore, have
recourse to a
necessarily existent
Being, who carries
the REASON of his
existence in
himself,


































"How can we understand the world in which we find ourselves? How does the universe behave? What is the nature of reality? Where did all this come from? Did the universe need a creator? ... Traditionally these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics."

[Stephen Hawking and Leonard Modinow, The Grand Design (New York: Bantam Books, 2010), 5]









that we could not explain the origin of the designer or of God, it does not follow from this that positing God "explains precisely nothing."











In any event, while there may be some debate as to how much of the nature of God is demonstrated by the scientific arguments,
















"I have written that The God Delusion made me ashamed to be an atheist and I meant it. Trying to understand how God could need no cause, Christians claim that God exists necessarily. I have taken the effort to try to understand what that means.





































"Objectively intrinsically prescriptive features [i.e., moral properties], supervening upon natural ones, constitute so odd a cluster of qualities and relations that they are most unlikely to have arisen in the ordinary course of events, without an all-powerful god to create them."


[J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism: Arguments For and Against the Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 115]





















































Neil deGrasse Tyson on Religion and Faith














Neil deGrasse Tyson on God














It may be true that some Christians have been part of the problem by how they view the role of reason in the life of the soul.


This is so only because they have failed to understand the proper relationship between faith and reason.




> Uses of the Term 'Faith' ←

- COMMON: synonymous with the term 'religion', e.g., the Christian faith
- THEOLOGICAL: theological virtue, "... for by grace are you saved through faith ..." (Eph. 2:8)
- EPISTEMOLOGICAL: relevant to how we come to know reality and hold certain beliefs












"I really wasn't sure where to turn. Where science offered exciting proofs of its claims, whether it was photos, equations, visible evidence, religion was a lot more demanding. It constantly wanted me to accept everything on faith. As I'm sure you're aware, faith takes a fair amount of effort."





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Do we as
Christians
maintain that
Christianity (as a
religion) wants
one to "accept
everything on
faith"?










If one occupies oneself with real theology one can pass by so-called natural theology only as one would pass by an abyss into which it is inadvisable to step if one does not want to fall. All one can do is to turn one's back upon it as upon the great temptation and source or error, by having nothing to do with it ... " [Karl Barth, "No!" trans. Peter Fraenkel, in Natural Theology: Comprising "Nature and Grace" by Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the Reply "No!" by Dr. Karl Barth (Eugene: Wipf and Stock: 2002), 75]




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[Karl Barth, "No!" trans. Peter Fraenkel, in *Natural Theology: Comprising "Nature and Grace" by Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the Reply "No!" by Dr. Karl Barth* (Eugene: Wipf and Stock: 2002), 75]

Natural Theology arises from God's General Revelation.

General Revelation: God's revelation of His existence and certain attributes to mankind through His creation.

Special Revelation: God's revelation of Himself through His prophets and apostles and ultimate through His taking on human nature in the Incarnation in Jesus Christ.






"For of what use would be the purest theology based on grace and revelation to me if I dealt with the subjects of grace and revelation in the way in which natural theology usually deals with it soi-disant data derived from reason, nature and history ...?"


[Karl Barth, "No!" trans. Peter Fraenkel, in Natural Theology: Comprising: "Nature and Grace" by Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the Reply "No!" by Dr. Karl Barth (Eugene: Wipf and Stock: 2002), 81]

Pronounced swa-de-zaun (lit. saying oneself), it is French for "so-called."

"For of what use would be the purest theology based on grace and revelation to me if I dealt with the subjects of grace and revelation in the way in which natural theology usually deals with it soi-disant data derived from reason, nature and history ...?"


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






"Reason and fact cannot be brought into fruitful union with one another except upon the presupposition of the existence of God and his control over the universe."

[Cornelius Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing, 1975), 18]












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
[Jason Lisle, "Fafth and Reason," https://answersingenesis.org/apologetics/fafth-vs-reason/, accessed 11/24/23]





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
[Jason Liste, "Faith and Reason," https://answersingenesis.org/apologetics/faith-vs-reason/, accessed 11/24/23]























If what Grenz says is true, then his own statement itself does not come from an observer who stands "outside the historical process" and, thus, the statement is not itself "neutral knowledge" coming from an "unconditioned specialist.'












"Postmodernism stresses the distinction between objectivity of facts, versus objectivity of knowledge or people. It accepts the possible existence of facts outside human context, but argues that all knowledge is mediated by an individual and that the experiences, biases, beliefs, and identity of that individual necessarily influence how they mediate any knowledge."

[Dan McGee, "Truth and Postmodernism" downloaded from https://medium.com/@danmcgee/truth-and-postmodernism-816ea9b3007a, 11/24/23]






"In the twentyfirst century
world ... the new
attitude ... is that
the use of reason
and science to
prove or
disprove a fact is
questionable. ...



"This ... points ... to the postmodern conclusion that we deal with 'interpreted facts.' ...






Homiletics: So then, the Traditional
Evangelicals function within a modern
worldview that is rationalistic, and
propositional.


Webber: "That probably is the most distinguishing feature of the Traditionalists. They've been shaped by the Enlightenment. So they work with modern philosophy, a modern understanding of science, history, sociology. They're modernist, and so they interpret the Christian faith through these modern categories.


Webber: "And what's very interesting about Traditional Evangelicals is that the categories through which they interpret the Christian faith are almost regarded as sacred, almost as sacred as the Christian faith itself. So if you say, 'Well, I don't believe in evidential apologetics,' there's something wrong with you."


[http://www.homileticsonline.com/subscriber/interviews/webber.asp, accessed 09/05/20. This interview apparently has been deleted by Homiletics Online.]



Reason Faith Believing something on the basis of demonstration. Reason Faith Believing something on the basis of authority.







Annals of Mathematics, 142 (1995), 443–551

Modular elliptic curves and Fermat's Last Theorem

By Andrew Wiles*

For Nada, Clare, Kate and Olivia

Cubum autem in duos cubos, aut quadratoquadratum in duos quadratoquadratos, et generaliter nullam in infinitum ultra quadratum potestatem in duos cjusdem nominis fas est dividere: cujus rei demonstrationem mirabilem sane detexi. Hanc marginis exiguitas non caperet.

Pierre de Fermat

Introduction

An elliptic curve over \mathbf{Q} is said to be modular if it has a finite covering by a modular curve of the form $X_0(N)$. Any such elliptic curve has the property that its Hasse-Weil zeta function has an analytic continuation and satisfies a functional equation of the standard type. If an elliptic curve over \mathbf{Q} with a given j-invariant is modular then it is easy to see that all elliptic curves with the same j-invariant are modular (in which case we say that the j-invariant is modular). A well-known conjecture which grew out of the work of Shimura and Taniyama in the 1950's and 1960's asserts that every elliptic curve over \mathbf{Q} is modular. However, it only became widely known through its publication in a paper of Weil in 1967 [We] (as an exercise for the interested readerly) in which, moreover, Weil gave conceptual evidence for the conjecture. Although it had been numerically verified in many cases, prior to the results described in this paper it had only been known that finitely many j-invariants were modular.

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In 1985 Frey made the remarkable observation that this conjecture should imply Fermat's Last Theorem. The precise mechanism relating the two was formulated by Serre as the \(\epsilon\)-conjecture and this was then proved by Ribet in the summer of 1986. Ribet's result only requires one to prove the conjecture for semistable elliptic curves in order to deduce Fermat's Last Theorem.

*The work on this paper was supported by an NSF grant.



Reason Faith Believing something on the basis of demonstration. Believing as something on the basis of Divine authority.


"For who cannot see that thinking [reason] is prior to believing [faith]? For no one believes anything unless he has first thought that it is to be believed.

Augustine (354-430)


[On the Predestination of the Saints, 5, as cited in Norman L. Geisler, ed. What Augustine Says (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1982), 13]

"Heaven forbid, after all, that God should hate in us that by which he made us more excellent that the other animals. Heaven forbid, I say, that we should believe in such a way that we do not accept or seek a rational account, since we could not even believe if we did not have rational souls."

[Letter 120, in *Letters 100-155* (Vol. II/2), trans. Roland Teske (Hyde Park: New City Press), p. 131]



"In certain matters, therefore, pertaining to the teaching of salvation, which we cannot grasp by reason, but which we will be able to at some point, faith precedes reason so that the heart may be purified in order that it may receive and sustain the light of the great reason, which is, of course, a demand of reason!"





[Letter 120, Teske, p. 131]


"Those things are said to be present to the understanding which do not exceed its capacity so that the gaze of understanding may be fixed on them. For a person gives assent to such things because of the witness of his own understanding and not because of someone else's testimony.


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
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)

































"God in regard of his existence is not only the discovery of faith, but of reason. God hath revealed not only his being, but some sparks of his eternal power and godhead in his works, as well as in his word. ... It is a discovery of our reason ... and an object of our faith ... it is an article of our faith and an article of our reason."

[Stephen Charnock, *Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1979), 27.]







by Richard G. Howe


Prolegomena


How Norman Geisler Helped Me in the Direction of My Life


How Norman Geisler Helped Me in the Direction of My Life

I was LED TO Christ in high school by Christian friends of mine. I grew spiritually about as much as one might expect a teenager to grow, becoming involved with my youth group at adurch and pursuing my interesting in drumming. After graduation, I headed to the community coilege to study music. I tell people that I learned enough music to annoy everyone around me. When it came time to consider senior college, Christian friends of mine told me that one could go to coilege and study the Bible. This sounded like a tremendous prospect to me, so of I went. I attended my denomination's flagship Christian college in my state. It was my first encounter with theological liberalism. My church had not prepared me to wrestle with issues like Higher Critician. As a result, I intellectually lot my faith in college. Looking back on that experience, I saw a range of responses among my friends who were confronted with the same intellectual challenges. Some of my friends with whom I had prayed in high school mockingly "asked Jesus to come out of their hearts" and repudiated their Christianity alogether. Others embraced the skepticism of the critical methods and settled for a mine and suggestion of the supplies of completely abundoning my faith, as shipprecked as it was lib neither was I comfortable with any sort of liberal theology. Others of my friends tried to amputate their intellect into their faith and reject any attempt to come to terms with the challenges and questions posed by critical thinking. That, too, was not appealing to me. I knew that I could not embrace a faith that would not stand up to reason. With this, lived in dissonnee for over a year.


The short version of the story has me being intellectually rescued by a handful of apologists. Through their books and lectures, God brought into my life people like isish McDowell. R. C. Sproul, and Norman Geisler. To this mix were added the insights and maturity of older brothers who had since come to the Lord. Bein












Notice the ad hominem / straw man fallacy. The argument Christian apologists are making has nothing to do with the existence of any "bearded man."

Imagine how offended Tyson would be if a Christian tried to refute evolution with the silly argument "if humans evolved from monkeys, why are there still monkeys!?"

Christians no more contend for the existence of a "bearded man" than evolutionists contend that humans evolved from monkeys. "I have no problems if, as we probe the origins of things, we bump up into the bearded man. If that shows up, we're good to go. Not a problem. There's just no evidence of it.




Granted Tyson may very well have engaged Christians who have the view that the Christian notion of 'faith' means believing in something in the absence of evidence.

I hope to show that the classical / traditional view of faith says no such thing.

As a scholar, Tyson should have taken the time to try to understand the best and strongest version of the Christian notion of faith before he tried to give any critique.

"And this is why religions are called faith, collectively.
Because you believe something in the absence of evidence. That's what it is.
That's why it's called faith.
Otherwise, we'd call all religions 'evidence'. But we don't for exactly that reason."




Again, it may very well have been the case that Tyson has encountered religious people who have this kind of disregard for what anyone might say about the world.


What is more, it may very well have been that these religious people characterize their disregard as "faith."

But I hope it is clear that this attitude of disregard does not comport with what the best Christian thinkers have maintained about faith and its relationship to reason.


"I mean, if you have religious faith, then whatever anyone says about the world wouldn't matter to you. If it does matter to you, then that's a different kind of contract that you're taking out on information.








"Thomas Aquinas's Proofs: The Uncaused Cause. Nothing is caused by itself. Every effect has a prior cause, and again we are pushed back into regress. This has to be terminated by a first cause, which we call God."





"All three of these arguments [by Aquinas] rely upon the idea of a regress and invoke God to terminate it. They make the entirely unwarranted assumption that God himself is immune to the regress."








While it is true that Aquinas uses the expression "this cannot go on to infinity" in his famous arguments for God's existence ...
















Dawkins is mistaken in assuming that Aquinas is making an infinite regress argument like the Kalam Cosmological Argument.






The Universe began to exist.

Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.

Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.

But this is not at all what Aquinas is arguing when he is denying the possibility of an infinite regress.



Note carefully the logic of the argument. Aquinas is not arguing:

"Since there cannot be a infinite regress, there must be a first cause."

Rather, he is arguing:

Since there must be first cause, there cannot be an infinite regress."

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"Since there cannot be a infinite regress, there must be a first cause."

Rather, he is arguing:

Since there must be first cause, there cannot be an infinite regress."

It is important to realize that the notion of 'first' here is not temporal but metaphysical.


Not: If (since) there cannot be an infinite regress, there must be a first cause. There cannot be an infinite regress. Therefore, there is a first cause.


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
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
Rather: If (since) there is a first cause, there cannot be an infinite regress. There is a first cause. Therefore, there cannot be an infinite regress.


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


















Dawkins is not alone in his mistaken assumption that Aquinas is arguing for the impossibility of an infinite regress in the Kalam sense.










"The question, however, is whether such an infinite series of motions (or causes) is conceivable. Thomas, of course, denied that it is. In reply, the series of positive integers—1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and so on—could be cited. It is clear that this series does not have a last term ... Similarly, it could be said that before any time t, however remote in the past, there was an earlier time t – 1, in which motion was occurring. If there is no greatest positive integer, why need there be any first motion?" [W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy: The Medieval Mind (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace


Jovanovich College Publishers, 1969): 219]
















"Aquinas believed that one could argue back from the things that we observe in the world to a prime mover, a first cause or a great designer behind it. In each case the drift of the argument follows the same basic pattern. Every event must have a cause. Nothing causes (or, for that matter, moves or designs) itself. If we press far enough back, we must acknowledge some first cause, prime mover or great designer of all things."

[Colin Brown, *Philosophy and the Christian Faith* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1968): 26-27, emphasis added]











"Other thinkers in theistic religions have held this position. The Islamic philosophers al-Kindi (c. 813-c. 871) and al-Ghazali (c. 1058-1111) believed that the infinite chain of caused causes is impossible, as Aristotle and Aquinas did. This is sometimes called the kalam tradition of Islam."

[Anthony C. Thiselton, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1985), 64-65, emphasis in original]









[Aquinas'] second proof, known as the first cause argument is presented as follows: everything that happens has a cause, and this cause in turn has a cause and so on in a series which must either be infinite or have its starting point in a first cause. Aquinas excludes the possibility of an infinite regress of causes, and so concludes that there must be a first cause, which we call God.


[John Hick, *Philosophy of Religion*, Prentice-Hall Foundations of Philosophy Series, eds. Elizabeth and Monroe Beardsley (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 20]




"The weakness of the [Second Way] argument as Aquinas states it lies in the difficulty (which he himself elsewhere acknowledges) of excluding as impossible an endless regress of events requiring no beginning."

[Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 21]










"Take again the arguments professing to prove the existence of God. All of these, except the one from teleology in lifeless things, depend upon the supposed impossibility of a series having no first term. Every mathematician know that there is no such impossibility; the series of negative integers ending with minus one is an instance to the contrary."

[Bettrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972); 462]





In his examination of Thomas
Aquinas's Second Way, Oppy
remarks: "It is very hard to see
how one could construct a
cogent argument for the claim
that there cannot be an infinite
regress of efficient causes.
Perhaps one might hope to argue
from Big Bang cosmology to the
claim that there is no infinite
regress of efficient causation,
but—as we shall go on to argue
in connection with the
kalām syllogism—



"it seems to be the case both that there can be infinite regresses of efficient causation within Big Bang universes and that efficient causation can extend 'through' the initial singularity in Big Bang universes. If this is right, then it is hard to see how one could hope to mount an empirical argument for the claim that there is no infinite regress of efficient causation in our world."

[Graham Oppy, *Arguing about Gods* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 101]


Note that Oppy assumes that the infinite regress of Aquinas's cosmological argument is the same as the infinite regress of the Kalam cosmological argument.


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Further, note that Oppy characterizes the issue as empirical (in the modern sense of 'empirical') rather than as metaphysical (in the classical sense of 'empirical').


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
[Graham Oppy, Arguing about Gods (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 101]





It is my contention that all of these are misunderstanding Aquinas and that Aquinas is not making a Kalam type of argument.





To understand Aquinas's argument here, it is necessary to understand the distinction between two types of infinite series.



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> TWO NOTIONS OF THE INFINITE IN THOMAS AQUINAS' SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 1, QUESTIONS 2 AND 46

> > Richard G. Howe, Ph.D.

Near the beginning of his Summa Theologiae, the thirteenth century Dominican monk, Thomas Aquinas, claims that "the existence of God can be proved in five ways." These arguments are regularly referred to as his Five Ways and are for many perhaps the most familiar reading from Thomas. Of particular interest for my purposes are the first three of these Five Ways in which Thomas clearly denies the possibility of "going on to infinity." I have discovered that a number of

1. Deam esse quimque viiz probari potest. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1, 2, 3. All English translations are from Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas, translation by Falber of the English Dominisan Povince (Wastenistee, MD. Christian Catalation, 1981). Homas acknowledges that certain of these arguments are not completely original with him. They are bound for example, in Aristotel's Physics VII, 124192 and Macrostra, VII, 7 1072-23. Though the Five Hoys are Thomas' most famous arguments for Gad's evidence, certain ones of them are expounded with greater detail in other of his works, melaning his human of instruct certain C. 1, 3.

2. procedere for procedaturf in infinitum


Richard G. Howe is Professor of Apologetics at Southern Evangelical Seminary in Charlotte. NC

"In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity per se — thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are per se required for a certain effect. ... But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity accidentally as regards efficient causes ..."

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274)


























































































"Even if we allow the dubious luxury of arbitrarily conjuring up a terminator to an infinite regress and giving it a name, simply because we need one, there is absolutely no reason to endow that terminator with any of the properties normally ascribed to God."

[Richard Dawkins. The God Delusion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006), 77]










"A final characteristic of cosmological arguments is that they typically issue in conclusions that—at least prima facie—are only very doubtfully of genuine religious significance. Even if, for examples, one can establish that there is an efficient cause for the existence of the visible (physical) universe, it is not at all clear why one should suppose that this efficient cause can be identified with the creative activity of any of the gods whose existence is postulated in extant world religions."

[Graham Oppy, Arguing about Gods (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 98]











While there may be some debate as to how much the scientific arguments can demonstrate the nature and attributes of God,



The Thomistic arguments not only demonstrate the existence of God, but demonstrate all of His classical attributes as well.



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