




Defining Evil
Distinguishing Evil
Different "Problems" of Evil
Historical Roots
Formulating the Problem
Some Non-Evangelical Options
Some Evangelical Options
The Classical Approach



In contemporary philosophy, evil usually has to do with pain, suffering, and death.

This definition of evil in contemporary philosophy differs from the definition of evil in the Classical / Scholastic (i.e., Aristotelian / Thomistic) tradition.









One of the most common distinctions contemporary philosophers make regarding evil is between natural evil and moral evil.












"The existence of evil is the most fundamental threat to the traditional Western concept of an all-good, all-powerful God.





"Both natural evil,
the suffering that
occurs as a result of
physical
phenomena, and
moral evil, the
suffering resulting
from human actions,
comprise the
problem of evil.




"If evil cannot be accounted for, then belief in the traditional Western concept of God is absurd."


[Andrea M. Weisberger, "The Argument from Evil," in The Cambridge Companion to Atheism. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 166, emphasis in original]








If God did not create evil, then it would seem either: evil is unreal or evil is not a thing.























Note that there is a difference between a privation and a negation.

A negation is the mere absence or removal of something.


A privation is the absence or removal of something that "ought" to be there.



A rock cannot see, but it is not blind because it "ought" not be able to see.

Blindness is the displacement of sight.
But blindness is not a thing in itself.






The Logical Problem of Evil


the logical problem of evil is notion that the propositions "God exists"

and

"Evil exists"

are logically incompatible





PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol. 10 No. 39

APRIL 1960

GOD AND EVIL


The Problem Syates:


Evil is a problem for the theist in that a contradiction is involved in he fact of evil on the one hand, and the belief in the omnipotence and perfection of God on the other. God cannot be both all-powerful and erfectly good if evil is real. This contradiction is well set out in the detail y Mackie in his discussion of the problem. In his discussion facts contradiction cannot be resolved in terms of man's free with In arguing in this way Mackie necks on show that this contradiction cannot be resolved in terms of man's free with the private of the way of the problem of this way Mackie necks on given musher of important soints, and concedes far too much to the theist. He implicitly allows that whilst physical evil creates a problem, this problem is reducible to the problem of evil turns on the compatibility of few will and absolute problems. In fact physical evil contact a number of delating problems and problems. In fact physical evil are contact a number of delating problems are contacted in the problem of moral evil in terms of free will not be evil the contact the problems of the problem of moral evil in terms of free will reacher the admittance of the problem of moral evil in terms of free will reacher the admittance of the problem of the problems of moral evil in terms of free will reacher the admittance of the problems of the on of the problem of moral evil in terms of free will renders by account for physical evil in terms of moral good, and the attem reduce the problem of well to the problem of moral evil, commands. Moreover, the account of moral evil in terms of free www. on more obvious and less disputable grounds than those who made evil can be shown to remain a problem whether we will is compatible with absolute goodness. I therefore prop pure to reopen the discussion of "the problem of evil", by any from a more general standpoint, examining a wider variety of an those considered by Mackies and its crities.


1º Evil and Omsipotence ", Mind, 1855.


"Evil is a problem for the theist in that a contradiction is involved in the fact of evil on the one hand and the belief in the omnipotence and perfection of God on the other."

[H. J. McCloskey, "God and Evil," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 10, no. 39 (April 1960): 97-114]










The basic intuition of the inconsistency involved in the problem of evil is captured by the following formulation, from Michael Martin:


- 1. God is all-powerful.
- 2. God is all good.
- 3. Evil exists in great abundance.

[Weisberger, "Argument," Cambridge Companion, 166]



Most philosophers today agree that ... surely no direct contradiction is generated by the three premises, without the addition of qualifying statements."

[Weisberger, "Argument," Cambridge Companion, 167]




J.L.Mackie

THE
MIRACLE
OF
THEISM


Arguments for and against the Existence of


God




"We can concede that the problem of evil does not, after all, show that the central doctrines of theism are logically inconsistent with one another."

[The Miracle of Theism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 154]










The Pastoral (Existential) Problem of Evil


The pastoral problem of evil address the emotional and practical ways of managing the personal experience of suffering in one's life.


The Philosophical /
Inductive /
Probabilistic /
Evidential / Moral
Problem of Evil















"If He is willing and is unable, He is feeble, which is not in accordance with the character of God; if He is able and unwilling, He is envious, which is equally at variance with God;











If God is all good (omnibenevolent), He would prevent evil.

➢ Premise 2 <</p>

If God is all powerful (omnipotent),
He could prevent evil.

➢ Premise 3 ≪

If God knew in advance that creation would fall into sin He would have either:

left well enough alone and not created in the first place


taken steps to prevent the occurrence of evil




There is evil, i.e. evil is not prevented.

& Conclusions **≪**

Either evil does not exist
or God is not all-good
or God is not all-powerful (or both)
or God is not all-knowing
or God does not exist





Evil does not exist.


God is not all-good.


God is not all-powerful.


God is not all-knowing.

God does not exist.










































































Manicheanism


"Evil stands as a completely independent principle against Good, and redemption from the power of Evil is to be achieved by recognizing this dualism and following the appropriate rules of life.




Manicheanism


"The opposition of God and Matter is seen in the realm of nature as the conflict of Light and Darkness, Truth and Error."

[R. McL. Wilson, "Mani and Manichaeism" in Paul Edwards, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 8 vols. (New York: Macmillan Publishing & The Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan, 1967), 5:149]









"The line of least resistance, then, as it seems to me, both in theology and in philosophy, is to accept, along with the superhuman consciousness, the notion that it is not all-embracing, the notion, in other words, that there is a God, but that he is finite, either in power or in knowledge, or in both at once."

[A Pluralistic Universe, Lecture VIII, Conclusions]



When Bad Things Happen to Good People

HE INSPIRATIONAL #1 BESTSELLER OVER 4 MILLION COPIES SOLD


HAROLD S. KUSHNER





"I recognize His
limitations. He is limited
in what He can do by the
laws of nature and by
the evolution of human
nature and human moral
freedom. ... Even God
has a hard time keeping
chaos in check and
limiting the damage that
evil can do"


[Harold S. Kushner, When Bad Things Happen to Good People, pp. 134, 43, cited in Norman L. Geisler and William D. Watkins, Worlds Apart: A Handbook on World Views, 2nd ed. (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2003), 203]



















"The fifth practical difference that the open view makes concerns our understanding and response to the problem of evil. ...

[God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2000), 98]




"My agnostic father ... asked me why God would allow Adolf Hitler to be born if he foreknew that this man would massacre millions of Jews. ...



"The only response I could offer then, and the only response I continue to offer now is that this was not foreknown as a certainty at the time God created Hitler."






In Fairness to Hartshorne and Boyd:


- They claim to hold to the doctrine of God's omniscience.
- But they would maintain a different definition of 'omniscience' than the Classical Theist.
- They would claim that propositions about the future are unknowable.


In Fairness to Hartshorne and Boyd:


➤ Thus, in their estimation, God is "omniscient" because God knows everything that can be known but God does not know the future because (in their view) the future is not knowable.





















The Natural Order Defense of C. S. Lewis











Since it is most often the Christian who is challenged with the problem of evil, it behooves the Christian to cull from the entire Christian world view in responding.


- In the consummation of history, all will be good.
- All moral goods will be rewarded. (which is good)
- > All moral evils will be punished. (which is good)














































For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead ...


Rom. 1:20a


The Classical tradition as exemplified in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas maintains can God's attributes can be rationally demonstrated.

One can find the most direct demonstration in Thomas Aquinas's Summa
Theologiae, I, Q6.

Included among those attributes are God's infinite goodness an omnipotence.

The metaphysics seeks to show that God is all good and all powerful even when we cannot demonstrate the connection between specific evils in the world and the specific goods that God might produce from them.





"As Augustine says 'Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil in his works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil.'
This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good."

[ST, I, Q2, art. 3, ad. 1]

